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Abstract 
Conventional models of decision making assume that animals and humans will evaluate 
available options based on the benefit that they provide and then choose the option that 
provides the largest benefit. However, there is evidence that the choices of both animals 
and humans violate this assumption as the choices that are made can be altered by the 
context in which decisions are presented. In this thesis I used free–living, foraging rufous 
hummingbirds (Selasphorus rufus) to investigate the effect of context on the decisions 
they make. Firstly, I gave birds choices between two preferred options and found that the 
addition of a third non-preferred option changed their preference when options varied in 
either two dimensions simultaneously (volume and concentration of sucrose), or in only a 
single dimension (volume or concentration). I also manipulated the learning context and 
found that hummingbirds have stronger preferences when options are learned 
simultaneously than when those same options are learned about sequentially. I also 
manipulated the experience that birds had of the options prior to the choice and found that 
birds with prior experience did not make different choices than hummingbirds without 
prior experience. In addition to work with hummingbirds, I also completed experiments 
with humans looking at the effect of context on decisions about health of others. I 
manipulated the yellowness of faces and found that when participants choose between two 
preferred options the addition of non-preferred options changed their preference. These 
data demonstrate humans and hummingbirds make irrational choices as the decision 
making context can change the choices that they make. Current theories of decision 
making are insufficient to explain context-dependent choices made by hummingbirds.  
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Introduction 
In order to survive and reproduce individuals, both animal and human, may 
make multiple decisions every day. These decisions include what to eat, where to find 
food, where to sleep and who to mate with. Not only do these individuals need to make 
decisions they need to make good decisions, furthermore in order to maximise fitness 
we predict that animals will choose the best options. To do this, individuals are 
expected to either assess the value of each option or to behave as if they can assess the 
value of each option (Arrow, 1959, Berg and Gigerenzer, 2010, Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein, 1996, Hammerstein and Hagen, 2005, Kahneman, 2003, Luce, 1959, Luce, 
1977, Luce, 1992, McFadden, 1999, Simon, 1959, Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1944).  The assumption that both animals and humans should behave as if they 
calculate the value of each of the options available has underpinned many of the 
experiments into decision making in humans and animals. For example, experiments 
investigating  the food and mating preferences of animals and humans are implicitly 
assuming that these preferences are related to the value of that trait (Amundsen et al., 
1997, Coetzee et al., 2009, Cotton et al., 2006, Freed, 2000, Harder and Real, 1987, 
Mitchell, 1989, Montgomerie, 1984, Montgomerie et al., 1984, Roberts, 1996, Ryan et 
al., 2007, Samson et al., 2010, Sanderson et al., 2006, Stephen et al., 2011, Summers et 
al., 1999, Thornhill and Gangestad, 1999). This assumption is grounded in utility 
theory which states that the number (or proportion) of choices made to any option is 
related to the value (or utility) of that option (Arrow, 1959, Luce, 1959, Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern, 1944).  
Expected utility theory was the solution proposed by Daniel Bernoulli to the St 
Petersburg paradox. The St Petersburg paradox was proposed by Nicolas Bernoulli in a 
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letter to Pierre Raymond de Montmort in 1713. The paradox is a lottery in which the 
possible winnings are infinitely large. Given that the winnings are infinite, people 
should be willing to play at any price, however as stated by Hacking “few of us would 
pay even $25” (Hacking, 1980). The solution which Daniel Bernoulli proposed to the 
paradox was Expected Utility Theory which formally introduced the idea of Utility 
(Bernoulli 1738: translated Bernoulli, 1954). Bernoulli stated that “the value of an 
option must not be based on its price, but rather on the utility it yields” and introduced 
the idea that the likelihood of an option being chosen should depend on the change in 
utility (the benefit or satisfaction an individual gains from a good or service), the 
likelihood of an event occurring and your current state. Since Bernoulli, there have 
been several mathematical representations for describing the predicted outcome of 
decisions (Arrow, 1959, Luce, 1959, Thurstone, 1927, Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944). Many of these representations differ only slightly in the 
predictions which they generate and therefore are difficult to distinguish practically 
(Luce, 1977). Although these representations are looking for the ‘best’ option they 
tend to use the idea of revealed preferences (Samuelson, 1938), so theory and practical 
uses of the theories are based on observations of an individual’s behaviour (their 
revealed preference) rather than a priori assumptions as to what the decision maker 
should prefer.  
In Economics the utility is the satisfaction that an individual gains from a 
particular option and the economically rational decision maker is expected to 
maximise their expected utility. As the utility derived from a particular option is not 
the same for each decision maker, in order to predict the decisions which people make 
economists assume that individuals are internally consistent in their preferences, but 
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that all individuals might not have the same preferences. This requirement for 
consistency is formalised in certain axioms, if the decision maker does not violate 
these axioms their choices are said to be economically rational. Both Luce (1959), and 
Von Nuemann and Morgenstern (1944) formalised four axioms of “rationality” which 
are a set of mathematical formulations which choices would obey if the decision maker 
made choices were maximising utility and so were economically rational. The first 
axiom of rationality states that rational choices should obey completeness, which states 
that a decision maker can either be indifferent between A and B, or they can prefer A 
more than B or they prefer B more than A. Preferences should also be transitive such 
that if the decision maker likes A more than B and B more than C then they should 
also like A more than they like C. The third axiom is that of continuity, which states 
that if A is preferred to B then an option very like A will also be preferred to B. 
Continuity describes choice where there are not large jumps in preference. The final 
axiom is the independence of irrelevant alternatives which states that if A is preferred 
to B then the addition of a non-preferred option C should not change the proportion of 
choices for either of the options A and B. In other words C is irrelevant to the choice 
between A and B. If choices do not conform to any of these axioms then rational 
choice then the choices are considered economically “irrational”.   
Economic rationality is not the only form of rationality, psychological 
rationality is different from economic rationality in that it focuses on the way on which 
the choice is made rather than the outcome of the choice as economic rationality does. 
In psychology a rational decision maker makes a decision in a way which is reasonable 
given the information which they have and their means of deciding, the definition of 
rationality is therefore a procedural one rather than the outcome as is the case with 
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economics. A focus on the procedure means that a decision could be objectively wrong 
but still be classed as a psychologically rational choice (Simon, 1986). As 
psychological rationality focuses on the internal thoughts and beliefs of an individual, 
it is not easy to demonstrate that animals can be psychologically rational or irrational. 
Although psychological rationality is not readily testable in animals there is another 
type of rationality which is readily testable- Biological rationality. Biological 
rationality is linked to the fitness of an individual. An individual is biologically 
rational if it acts to increase its inclusive fitness (Kacelnik 2006). The definition of 
biological rationality is similar to that of economic rationality as it can be measured 
according to the outcome of the choice, although with biological rationality it is a 
change in the fitness of the animal rather than the outcome of a particular choice. It is 
possible for a decision maker to be rational according to one of these definitions but 
irrational by another. For example, if a foraging bird were to have a strong preference 
for a very poor food source across different contexts and make internally consistent 
choices the animal would be economically rational as their choices were consistent but 
biologically irrational as consistently choosing the very poor food source would 
decrease its relative fitness. The advantage of looking at economic rationality in 
animals is that violations of economic rationality might shed light on the mechanisms 
animals may be using to make decisions. Demonstrating economically irrational 
choices in animals would not imply that the animal was also biologically irrational.  
Some of the first examples of economically irrational choices were described 
by Kahneman and Tversky and were violations of transitivity (Tversky, 1969). 
Although perhaps their most striking example of irrational decision-making is the 
finding that the way a decision is framed can hugely alter the option that people choose 
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(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).  This was found in an experiment where participants 
were told that there was an outbreak of a rare Asian disease which had infected 600 
people and were asked to choose between two alternative programs of treatment. In 
one treatment (problem 1) participants were told how many people would survive as a 
result of treatment and in the other treatment (problem 2) participants were told how 
many people would die despite treatment; the options in both treatments were the same 
in respect to the actual numbers of people who would die. The values in the brackets 
indicate the percentage of participants who choose each of the treatment options. 
Problem 1- 
Program A:  If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved [72%]. 
Program B:  If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be 
saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved [28%]. 
Problem 2- 
Program C:  If Program C is adopted 400 people will die [22%]. 
Program D:  If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 
2/3 probability that 600 people will die [78%]. 
 In problem 1 72% of participants favored the certain option where 200 out of 
600 people would live, whereas in problem 2 only 22% of participants said that 400 
out of 600 people should die. Obviously these two options are equivalent and therefore 
rational decision makers should have treated them as the same thing. If people made 
choices consistent with utility theory, then the outcome should not have been changed 
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by the way that the choice was framed. These violations of economic rationality 
suggested that when making decisions humans treat losses differently than gains. 
Importantly, it also demonstrated that violations of rationality could be used to 
examine decision-making mechanisms. This changed the course of the way researchers 
thought about decision making and importantly has changed the focus of work from 
the examination of what people choose to the way in which choices are made.  
Since the Tversky and Kahneman (1981) experiment, economically irrational 
choices have been found in human decision making in a wide range of experimental 
situations looking at products (Ge et al., 2009, Prelec et al., 1997, Simonson, 1990, 
Simonson and Tversky, 1992, Tanner, 2008), services (Dato-on and Dahlstrom, 2003), 
voting (Callander and Wilson, 2006, Hedgcock et al., 2009), attractiveness (Geiselman 
et al., 1984, Kenrick and Gutierres, 1980, Kernis and Wheeler, 1981, Melamed and 
Moss, 1975, Wanke et al., 2001, Wedell et al., 1987, Wedell et al., 2005). In these 
experiments the majority of irrational choices are violations of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (Bateman et al., 2008, Choplin and Hummel, 2005, Colman et 
al., 2007,  Doyle et al., 1999, Heath and Chatterjee, 1995, Hedgcock et al., 2009, 
Pechtl, 2009, Pettibone and Wedell, 2000, Pettibone and Wedell, 2007, Reaney, 2009, 
Slaughter et al., 2011, Tsetsos et al., 2010, Wedell, 1991, Wedell and Pettibone, 1996). 
These violations of rational choice have led psychologists to attempt to determine the 
mechanisms which may result in economically irrational choices (Choplin and 
Hummel, 2005, Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996, Gigerenzer et al., 1999, Hotaling et 
al., 2010, Kahneman, 2003, Kahneman and Thaler, 2006, Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979, McGraw et al., 2010, Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009, Roe et al., 2001, Simonson 
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and Tversky, 1992, Sunstein et al., 2002, Tsetsos et al., 2010, Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974, Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). Economists are 
interested in predicting the behaviour of markets therefore the utility curves used to 
predict the behaviour of people in a variety of situations are altered to better describe 
the choices that people make. However, the underlying mechanism which may be 
causing irrational changes in preference is rarely considered (Berg and Gigerenzer, 
2010, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
There are different approaches to understanding irrational choice. One such 
approach, frequently used by economists I am going to refer to as optimization under 
constraints (although is sometimes called bounded rationality). The people using this 
approach suggest that the decision maker is attempting to make an optimal choice but 
some constraints (such as constraints on the brain, perceptual system, time or memory) 
may prevent the decision maker from achieving economic rationality and therefore if 
we knew enough about the various constraints on the system we would be able to 
model decision making as if it were rational (Eilon, 1972, Livnat and Pippenger, 2008, 
Taylor, 1975, Wall, 1993). Confusingly there is another approach also termed 
Bounded rationality. This form of bounded rationality in the tradition of Herbert 
Simon is the approach most commonly taken by psychologists. Herbert Simon argued 
that good decisions could be made in less time and with less information if individuals 
exploited only certain features of their environments (Simon, 1959, Simon, 1997). 
Individuals could achieve this by satisficing where instead of making the best choice 
individuals attempt to achieve some minimum level of a particular variable (Simon, 
1959, Simon, 1997). Alternatively, if one cue was a reasonable indicator of the quality 
of all available options then individuals could ignore other cues and make a decision 
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using one piece of information only. This approach suggests that in particular 
environments choice processes can be simplified and yet still produce good decisions 
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996, Gigerenzer et al., 1999, Simon, 1997) for example 
by using certain ‘rules of thumb’ or heuristics to aid that decision-making processes by 
enabling the decision maker to use less information (Hutchinson and Gigerenzer, 
2005). Heuristics would be expected to work well in most situations (i.e. result in 
approximately the ‘right’ or most efficient outcome) but wouldn’t be expected to result 
in rational choices (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). It has been suggested that if the 
heuristic used was appropriate for the decision making environment the choices that 
resulted might be better than if the individual rigidly stuck to the formal logic of 
economic rationality, this is termed ecological rationality (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). An 
example of ecological rationality in practice is the decisions about the care given to a 
person admitted to hospital with a suspected heart attack. The patients must be 
classified as high or low risk upon arrival to ensure that they receive appropriate 
treatment. Many measurements could be taken, all of the information could be 
considered together, put into a statistical package, weighted in terms of how important 
each measurement is to the diagnoses. However, this would be time consuming as well 
as requiring the patient to have a battery of tests, some of which may not even be that 
important in influencing the decision reached. Now consider the advantages of 
following a simple decision making tree such as this one (Figure 1) created by 
Breiman (1993), here large amounts of information do not need to be collected before 
a decision is reached. Instead a maximum of three yes/no questions have to be 
answered to decide whether the patient should be classed as high risk or not. By using 
a heuristic like this a decision about treatment can be made more quickly and with less 
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information. When the decision making tree described here is compared to a complex 
statistical model the simple tree performs better at categorising patients than the model 
taking into account all of the information (Breiman et al., 1993).  
 
Figure 1.  
A decision making tree for the categorisation of heart attack patients into high and low 
risk categories taken from Gigerenzer and Todd (2000). 
In humans, heuristics are usually something which people spontaneously use to 
help make decisions rather than the formalised heuristic described in Figure 1, 
however the principal would remain the same and the heuristic would still be expected 
to enable the person to make a good choice (most of the time) and to use less 
information than a rational choice. An example of a heuristic working in the animal 
world is the oviposition decisions made by the parasitiod wasp Trichogramma 
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minutum instead of assessing the volume of a host using length and height, the wasp 
instead assesses the curvature of the host (Schmidt and Smith, 1987). The wasp makes 
good decisions about the size of the host and oviposits appropriately whilst needing 
less information. 
 Both the bounded rationality approach of psychologists and the optimization 
under constraints approach of economists have been argued to be more feasible than 
rationality as they take into account that the brain and perceptual systems are not 
unlimited in their capacities (Rabin, 1998). However, the approaches differ as 
optimization under constraints suggests that humans are limited in their time and 
information and so should use a stopping rule to determine when the benefit of 
collecting more information outweighs the cost of collecting that information. As a 
result of a stopping rule the decision maker would need to know the cost of searching, 
the utility they have at each point in the search and the utility that they could require if 
they continued to acquire information (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). Whereas boundedly 
rational decision makers are expected to make mostly good choices without calculating 
the utility of the options available. The common ground between these theories is the 
recognition that Expected Utility Theory is insufficient to explain many of the choices 
made by people.  
Not only is utility theory fundamental to theories of human decision making, it 
has formed the backbone of key theories of animal decision making. Economic ideas 
of various types have been very influential in biology, for example the markets of 
economics are represented in biology in the form of mating “markets” (Hammerstein 
and Hagen, 2005) where animals are modelled as if they choose the traits of other 
animals just like human would be expected to choose products with animals attempting 
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to get the mate with the most attractive features (Noë and Hammerstein, 1994). Game 
theory has also been derived from economic game theory in which cooperation on 
tasks has been used to describe human and animal decisions (Axelrod and Hamilton, 
1981, Smith, 1979). Optimal foraging theory is similar to the Expected Utility Theory 
of economics by assuming that the most successful animals would be those which 
could forage most efficiently to maximise a determinant of their fitness such as net 
energy gained (Charnov, 1976, Pyke, 2010, Perry and Pianka, 1997, Pyke et al., 1977, 
Stephens and Charnov, 1982). Animals are expected to maximise a function such as 
energy intake like economists expect decision makers to maximise utlity. However, as 
rational choices which maximise expected utility do not describe the choices made by 
humans, rational choice theory was also investigated in animals. 
As a result of these investigations it is becoming clear that animals like humans 
can make economically irrational decisions (Bateson et al., 2002, Latty and Beekman, 
2011, Shafir, 1994, Waite, 2001b). Economically irrational choices might be favoured 
by natural selection if the benefits of making irrational choices (such as quicker 
decision-making) are greater than the costs of not consistently choosing the option 
with the highest energy. Therefore animals could forage optimally without needing to 
be economically rational. Looking at economic rationality in animals could help to 
establish the decision making mechanism which animals may be using. As we have a 
much greater understanding of the instances in which humans make irrational choices, 
the experimental testing of animal decision making has been heavily influenced by 
experimental paradigms used to examine human decision making (Bateson et al., 2002, 
Bateson et al., 2003, Chen et al., 2006, Latty and Beekman, 2011, Shafir, 1994, Shafir 
et al., 2002, Waite, 2001b). An example of an experimental paradigm used in human 
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decision making which was then tested in animals is the framing effect described 
previously in Tversky and Kahneman (1981) where there is an outbreak of a disease 
and the question is framed as lives saved or lives lost. A similar paradigm has been 
used with capuchin monkeys in a token trading game, here options were either 
presented as a loss or a gain. Monkeys had a choice of two options in the first option 
monkeys were presented with two food items and 50% of the time were given both and 
50% of the time one was taken away so they were given one. In the other option they 
were presented with one food item and 50% of the time they got this item only and 
50% of the time they had another item added and received two rewards. Despite the 
two options having the same average pay off the monkeys preferred the option framed 
as a gain (when an option was added) more than they did the option framed as a loss 
(Chen et al., 2006); this result is consistent with the human data (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981). When options are variable starlings also seem to be sensitive to 
framing effects, when options are presented as a loss (the birds get less than they 
expect) starlings choose variable options more frequently than options which are not 
variable (Marsh and Kacelnik, 2002). 
As is the case with humans, probably the best investigated of the violations of 
rationality in animals is the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Humans violate the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives regularly when inferior options are added to the 
choice set: these options do change the participants’ preference for the better, available 
options (Choplin and Hummel, 2005, Colman et al., 2007, Doyle Heath and Chatterjee, 
1995, Hedgcock et al., 2009, Pechtl, 2009, Pettibone and Wedell, 2000, Pettibone and 
Wedell, 2007, Slaughter et al., 2011, Wedell, 1991, Wedell and Pettibone, 1996). The 
most common violation of irrelevant alternatives in human choice is the 
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asymmetrically dominating decoy effect (or just the decoy effect). Here an inferior 
option (a decoy) is added to the choice set and the addition of this decoy increases the 
preference for the option that it is dominated by (Bateman et al., 2008, Colman et al., 
2007,  Doyle et al. 1999, Heath and Chatterjee, 1995, Pechtl, 2009). An option is 
asymmetrically dominated when it is inferior in every dimension to one of the options 
and inferior to another option in at least one dimension but superior in at least one 
dimension. For example, in Figure 2 the decoy is inferior to the target option in both 
dimension 1 and 2 and therefore is dominated by the target option, the competitor 
however, is superior to the decoy in dimension 2 but inferior in dimension 1. As the 
addition of a decoy option is expected to increase the preference for the option which 
dominates it, the presence of the decoy option in choice sets would be expected to 
increase the proportion of choices for the target option compared to choice sets without 
the presence of the decoy option, which violates the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives. 
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Figure 2. 
An example of a decoy being asymmetrically dominated, in this case the decoy is 
dominated by the target but not by the competitor. The grey area indicates all of the 
possible positions in which the decoy could be in order to be asymmetrically 
dominated by the target.  
  Violations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives have been reported in 
the choices made by birds, fish, mammals, and invertebrates (Bateson et al., 2002, 
Bateson et al., 2003, Hurly and Oseen, 1999, Morgan et al., 2012, Royle et al., 2008, 
Sasaki and Pratt, 2011, Scarpi, 2011, Shafir et al., 2002). As the asymmetrically 
dominating decoy effect has been one of the most robust violations of rationality in 
humans, therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that experiments trying to recreate the 
effect have also been carried out in animals (Bateson et al., 2002, Bateson et al., 2003, 
Latty and Beekman, 2011, Royle et al., 2008, Sasaki and Pratt, 2011, Shafir et al., 
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2002). However, sometimes in animal experiments the addition of these decoy options 
do not increase the preference for the option which they are dominated by (as in 
humans), instead the addition of these decoy options increase the preference for the 
options which they are not dominated by (Bateson et al., 2003, Morgan et al., 2012, 
Royle et al., 2008, Shafir et al., 2002). The majority of animal experiments looking at 
irrationality have to date replicated the design of experiments with humans (Bateson et 
al., 2002, Bateson et al., 2003a, Royle et al., 2008, Sasaki and Pratt, 2011, Scarpi, 
2011, Shafir, 1994, Shafir et al., 2002, Waite, 2001a, Waite, 2001b), this is because 
there is a relative wealth of studies in human decision making which have provided 
possible circumstances where irrational choice might be likely to occur. However, 
when a robust human paradigm such as the decoy effect is replicated in animals and 
does not generate similar choices, the assumption that the processes underlying these 
changes in preference are similar may need to be questioned. An investigation into the 
similarities and differences between the choices made by humans and animals would 
be worthwhile to establish if these systems are similar enough for the choices made by 
humans to continue to be worthwhile, as a starting point for experiments with animals.  
Currently experiments looking at irrational choice in animals are mostly 
focused on the addition of inferior options to choices amongst options which vary in 
two dimensions (Bateson et al., 2002, Bateson et al., 2003, Latty and Beekman, 2011, 
Royle et al., 2008, Sasaki and Pratt, 2011, Scarpi, 2011, Shafir et al., 2002). However, 
the addition of inferior asymmetrically dominating decoy options is not the only way 
in which context could influence the choices which animals make. Background context 
in terms of previous experience of the options has been shown to change the choices 
made to options by gray jays (Waite, 2001a, Waite and Passino, 2006), violations of 
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the independence of irrelevant alternatives has also been shown in options which only 
vary in a single dimension (Bateson, 2002, Hurly and Oseen, 1999, Morgan et al., 
2012). As context-dependent decisions seem to be made by animals in a variety of 
circumstances, future experiments looking at the effect of context on choice could look 
at manipulating other types of context, such as context whilst learning, at what stage in 
the experiments is the decoy presented as well as previous experience; may well find 
that these types of context also change the choices made.  
In this thesis I attempted to address the similarities or differences in the 
irrational decision making behaviour of humans and animals. In addition I also 
investigated the variety of instances in which context might change the choices made 
by animals. To do this I conducted a series of foraging experiments using wild free-
living rufous hummingbirds in addition to experiments using human subjects.  
The rufous hummingbird Selasphorus rufus is a small (around three grams) 
hummingbird that migrates from its overwintering sites in Mexico to its breeding 
grounds in the United States (as far north as Alaska) and Canada. These birds are 
suitable for research in the effects of context on decision making for a number of 
biological and logistical reasons. Firstly, the nectar provided by the flowers on which 
the birds feed can vary in a number of ways, including the concentration and volume 
of the nectar provided, the nectar refill rate and the length of a flower’s corolla. Not 
only do the flowers vary in these ways, it is clear that hummingbirds can detect and 
respond to many aspects of the reward provided, including changes in the 
concentration, volume, variability and refill schedule of the flowers from which they 
forage, generally preferring higher concentration, larger volumes, less variability and 
adjusting their return rates to approximate the refill schedules of flowers (Blem et al., 
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2000, Henderson et al., 2006, Hurly and Oseen, 1999, Montgomerie, 1984, Tamm and 
Gass, 1986). Therefore, there are many possible aspects of flowers which can be 
manipulated experimentally and that we know hummingbirds will respond to.    
 In addition to the complexity of its natural food resources, the rufous 
hummingbird migrates vast distances and will encounter a wide range of habitats and 
feeding environments. Therefore, the options that the birds encounter are expected to 
be quickly learned and the birds’ preference for these options should be flexible and 
dependent on the other options available in order for birds to be able to take advantage 
of a variety of different environments. As birds are expected to be aware of other 
options in order to respond to changing environmental conditions, context in terms of 
the other options available may be affecting the choices that they make.  
During experiments a territorial male Rufous hummingbird will feed 
approximately every 10 minutes throughout the day (Bacon et al., 2010, Hixon and 
Carpenter, 1988). As a result they make many choices in a day so the cost of making 
one poor choice for hummingbirds is likely to be low. It is assumed that decision 
making is time consuming and expensive (either due to brain activation or due to 
missed opportunities) (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996, Gigerenzer et al., 1999, 
Simon, 1959, Simon, 1997). In animals we know that decision making is time 
consuming as animals show a speed accuracy trade off where faster decisions are less 
accurate (Chittka et al., 2009). Decision-making in hummingbirds is also assumed to 
be costly or time consuming and as hummingbirds make many choices in a day these 
costs would be expected to add up. As a result a bird that could minimise the costs of 
making decisions would have a selective advantage over other birds. Therefore we 
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might expect that hummingbirds are a very plausible animal to make short cuts in their 
decision making.  
Looking at decision making in the field has biological advantages. The 
advantage to testing context-dependent decision-making in wild, free-living animals is 
that their decisions are made in a ‘real-life’ situation, i.e. the birds make foraging 
decisions in our experiments whilst they continue to display to, and mate with, 
females, as well as defending their territory from intruding males. Therefore the 
choices which are made have real fitness consequences and if bird fails to make good 
choices then they may not survive or may not be able to defend their territory and 
reproduce. In contrast animals in laboratory situations which are receiving 
supplementary feeding may become indifferent to options over time as there are no 
fitness consequences of the choices that they make. The choices made by 
hummingbirds in the wild may, then, be more likely to represent decisions that are 
made under the time constraints and competition this species would experience in its 
daily life. However, laboratory experiments do have several advantages over field 
experiments as the age, experience, nutritional state or body condition of animals can 
be controlled. As a result if there are individual differences in decision making these 
might be able to be explained.   
Hummingbirds are considered to be net rate maximisers (Hixon, 1982, 
DeBenedictis et al., 1978). So when making decisions birds would be predicted to take 
almost exclusively from the option with the highest caloric pay off. The option with 
the highest caloric pay off would be the option with the largest number of calories 
given for the cost taken to acquire it. As viscosity of sucrose increases with 
concentration, handling times may be higher with more concentrated sucrose as the 
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time taken to load the sucrose onto the tongue via capillary action will be longer 
(Kingsolver and Daniel, 1983). However, larger volumes will incur greater flight costs 
and so birds should not fill their crops with sucrose (DeBenedictis et al., 1978). As the 
viscosity of sucrose will change with temperature it will not always be possible to 
predict the option that a net rate maximising hummingbird would choose in the field.  
However, in the same environmental conditions it would be expected that the same 
option would be preferred in each choice set. As such the prediction would be that the 
proportion of choices to the best option (whichever that may be) would be the same in 
each choice set.  
 In addition to being a biologically plausible candidate, there are also a number 
of logistical benefits to using rufous hummingbirds for examining context-dependent 
decision-making. On arrival at their breeding grounds, rufous hummingbird males 
establish and strongly defend a feeding territory.  At the site in the eastern Canadian 
Rockies where I conducted my research, the territories are established around artificial 
feeders containing sucrose solution, which are hung between trees along the length of 
the Westcastle valley in early May. The birds are caught and marked with an 
application of ink to the breast feathers allowing the birds to be identified within a 
breeding season without the need for recapture. As the territorial males vigorously 
exclude other males from their breeding territory I can reliably train and test 
individuals.  
As the hummingbirds are free-living they can feed from flowers growing in the 
environment if they wish. However, they do not. The birds participating in our 
experiments feed almost exclusively from the feeder placed in their territory and then 
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from the sucrose provided in the experiment(s). As a result I can monitor the energetic 
intake of the hummingbirds through the amount of sucrose that they drink in the 
experiment, although I am not able to measure energy expenditure, which may vary 
considerably across the course of the experiments as a result of differences in 
temperature and activity. Rufous hummingbirds birds can be trained to experimental 
apparatus within an hour or two and not only do birds learn to feed from a variety of 
artificial feeders or ‘flowers’, they will also readily learn associations between the 
colour and the contents of those feeders. Furthermore, territorial male will feed around 
once every 10 minutes which means a fairly large amount of data can be collected in 
the space of a field season.  
 In addition to experiments using hummingbirds, this thesis also contains 
experiments using human participants. Experiments with humans are often not directly 
comparable to those with animals as animals do not have language. This is important 
as generally humans are told about the options whereas animals have to experience 
each of the options repeatedly to learn about them.  Therefore, to compare human 
decision making with that of animals, I conducted experiments which shared a key 
feature with animals, namely that humans had to assess the value of the options 
themselves. 
 
In the research described in this thesis I had two main aims.  
(1) To determine how context affects the choices that hummingbirds make when 
foraging. To do this, I designed experiments in which different types of context 
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were manipulated. This included the types of options presented as well as the 
impact of current or previous context on the choices made. 
(2) To determine how similar hummingbird decision-making is to decision-making 
by humans. To do this, I gave humans and hummingbirds comparable 
experiments in which decoy options were added to choice sets.  
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Chapter 2: Context-dependent decision-making in hummingbirds: the role of 
decoys and energetic state on preference 
Introduction 
Economists and ethologists alike are interested in the choices a human or an animal 
should make in order to maximise their fitness. Neoclassical economists (the dominant 
school of economics today) predict what humans will choose by assuming that humans 
should maximise the utility acquired for their given budget (Kahneman and Thaler, 
2006). In economics, utility is the satisfaction that the individual derives from each 
option while for animals, utility is equivalent to the currency the animal is expected to 
maximise in a specific choice situation. For example, when foraging, animals are 
expected to attempt to maximise energy intake but when choosing a mate, animals are 
expected to try to choose the partner that will maximise their own fitness (Pyke et al., 
1977). When predicting the choices that an individual should make, both optimal 
foraging theory and economics models make the same assumptions: that the individual 
uses all the information that they have available, individuals should choose the best 
option.  
 In economics, rational choice theory describes the decision making behaviour 
of an individual that is consistent choosing options which maximise the utility they 
acquire. Rational choice theory is based on the use of simple axioms of choice to 
predict the preference for different options. One such axiom is Luce’s choice axiom 
(Luce, 1959), which states that the probability of choosing an option is the value (or 
utility) of that option divided by the sum of all the utilities of all options in the choice 
set.  A consequence of defining an economically rational choice in this way is that the 
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choice of an option is expected to be independent of irrelevant alternatives, such that 
the probability of an individual choosing A from a choice set of A and B should not be 
influenced by the addition of an inferior option C. The reason for this independence is 
that the presence of an inferior option should not change the ratio of the utilities of A 
and B. 
 The independence of irrelevant alternatives is frequently violated when humans 
make decisions across a variety of different domains, including elections (Hedgcock et 
al., 2009), employment decisions (Slaughter et al., 2011), as well as consumer 
purchasing (Bateman et al., 2008, Doyle et al., 1999, Heath and Chatterjee, 1995, 
Simonson, 1989).  When choices are susceptible to changes in context (in this case, the 
addition of inferior options to a choice set), humans are not making economically 
rational decisions: instead of assigning each option a fixed value depending on its 
utility and so making an ‘absolute’ choice, people are judging options relative to the 
other options in the choice set. A result of not assigning each option a fixed value is 
that the addition of irrelevant alternatives can change the preferences between options.  
The most well-studied violation of irrelevant alternatives is the asymmetrically 
dominating decoy effect, in which typically an inferior option (decoy) is added to a 
choice set of two options that vary in two dimensions. An asymmetrically dominating 
decoy is inferior to both of the original options but is similar to one of the options in 
one or more dimensions. The presence of an asymmetrically dominating decoy causes 
an increase in preference for the option to which it is most similar (Bateman et al., 
2008, Colman et al., 2007, Huber et al., 1982, Krumhansl, 1978). .  
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 Like human decision-making, animal decision-making does not seem to be 
independent of the effects of irrelevant alternatives. When asymmetrically dominating 
decoys are added to choice sets, animals change their preferences (Bateson, 2002, 
Bateson et al., 2002, Bateson et al., 2003, Hurly and Oseen, 1999, Latty and Beekman, 
2011, Shafir et al., 2002, Waite, 2001b). These changes in preference in response to 
the addition of decoys suggest that animals, like humans, might be using relative 
decision-making strategies (Bateson, 2002, Bateson et al., 2003, Latty and Beekman, 
2011, Morgan et al., 2012, Shafir et al., 2002). However, for foraging hummingbirds, 
at least, it is possible that the violations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
are due to the lower energy return offered by the inferior decoy options changing the 
state of the animal (Schuck-Paim et al., 2004).  Hummingbirds foraging on the inferior 
decoy as they learn about the decoy could cause the animal to select more of the option 
with the highest energetic content to compensate for the decreased intake caused by 
sampling the poorer option. This could explain why foraging hummingbirds faced with 
three options, two favourable (one sweeter but smaller and the other less sweet but 
larger) and one poor changed their preferences in the presence of the poor option as 
they tended to prefer the sweeter, smaller option, which also provided a slightly higher 
caloric return (Bateson et al. 2002, Bateson et al. 2003, Morgan et al. 2012).  It still 
remains plausible, then, that economically irrational choices in foraging animals are 
due to changes in energetic state rather than to a comparative choice mechanism.   
 Hummingbirds are thought to be net energy rate maximisers (Hixon and 
Carpenter, 1988, Houston and Krakauer, 1993).  The reproductive success of an energy 
maximiser is an increasing function of its net energy intake (Hixon, 1982). The net 
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energy intake of the birds would be the amount of energy consumed minus the cost of 
acquisition and processing then divided by the length of time. In experiments offering 
options which vary in both the concentration and volume of sucrose all of the options 
will have different amounts of energy but they will also have different costs. There are 
two separate costs which might be incurred differentially by the options provided. The 
first is the time it takes to extract the sucrose from each option. Increasing the 
concentration of sucrose also increases its viscosity. Hummingbirds feed by using the 
tubes in the tongue to suck up sucrose via capillary action (Kingsolver and Daniel, 
1983). If birds use the capillary action to drink sucrose, then more concentrated 
solutions of sucrose would incur a greater cost as they would be taken up more slowly 
by the birds. However, there is recent evidence that the tongue of the hummingbird 
acts as a fluid trap rather than a capillary tube (Rico-Guevara and Rubega, 2011) and 
therefore higher viscosities should not carry a much higher time cost. The second cost 
which may occur differentially over the options is the cost of transporting the sucrose. 
Drinking a large volume of sucrose will result in increasing flight costs (DeBenedictis 
et al., 1978) therefore to reduce flight costs hummingbirds should try to take in a lower 
volume of higher concentration sucrose. Given that both the viscosity of sucrose and 
the energy required by hummingbirds will change with temperature it is unlikely that 
we would be able to calculate all of the costs and benefits that each option may bring 
to hummingbirds in the wild. However, the advantage of looking at economic 
rationality to examine decision making mechanisms in hummingbirds is that we do not 
need to complete these calculations. Instead it is assumed that the costs and benefits of 
choosing an option with a particular volume and concentration should be the same in 
each choice.  
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In this experiment, I attempted to use asymmetrically dominating decoys to see 
if hummingbirds made economically irrational decisions and if so, whether these 
changes were more consistent with comparative decision-making mechanisms or 
context-dependent utility caused by energy state changes.  To do this, for the first 
treatment, I repeated the design of part of the asymmetrically dominating decoy 
experiment described in Bateson et al. (2003) but I added a second, key treatment.  In 
the first treatment, birds were offered a choice between two favourable options: a 
Concentration option (20µl of 40% sucrose solution) presented alongside a Volume 
option (40µl of 20% sucrose; Figure 1a). I then presented these two favourable options 
alongside a decoy that was either 10µl of 30% sucrose (the Concentration Decoy) or 
30µl of 10% (the Volume Decoy).  If the birds respond to asymmetrically-dominated 
decoys in a way similar to the ways humans respond, then the addition of the 
Concentration Decoy should increase the birds’ preference for the Concentration 
option over the Volume option and the Volume Decoy should produce the reverse 
response.  However, as Bateson et al. (2003) found that the hummingbirds tended to 
prefer the Concentration option, which offered a slightly greater caloric return (155 kJ; 
Table 1) over the Volume option (142 KJ), we ran a second treatment in which the 
Concentration option (now 20µl of 35%) offered slightly less in calories (132 kJ) than 
did the Volume option (as in the first treatment) (Figure 1b). The decoys remained the 
same as in the first treatment and both offered a little over 50kJ caloric return.  In the 
second treatment, the birds should prefer the Volume option over the Concentration 
(the ‘Alternative’ Concentration) option in the binary choice and if they base their 
decision on caloric intake, then preference for the Volume option should increase in 
the presence of either decoy. Importantly, and unlike Bateson et al. (2003), I also 
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measured the amount of sucrose the birds actually consumed on each choice.  In the 
previous experiments, visits to options were assumed to result in the entire contents of 
the well being consumed but it is increasingly obvious that hummingbird do not do 
this, even when the option visited is relatively good (Bacon, 2011).  If, on the other 
hand, the birds make relative decisions, then their choice should change in response to 
the presence of a decoy and be different for each decoy.  
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Figure 1a. Relative positions on the concentration and volume dimensions of the four 
flower types used in the Concentration Treatment. The Volume option (V) contains 40 
µl of 20% sucrose (142 joules per well), the Concentration option (C) 20 µl of 40% 
(155 joules), the Volume Decoy option  (DV) 30 µl of 10% (51 joules) and the 
Concentration decoy option (DC) 10 µl of 30% (55 joules). The lines are isoclines 
where the energy at each point in the isocline is equal.  
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Figure 1b. Relative positions on the concentration and volume dimensions of the four 
flower types used in the Volume Treatment. The Volume option (V)contains 40 µl of 
20% sucrose (142 joules per well), the Alternative Concentration option (AC) contains 
20µl of 35%, the Volume Decoy option  (DV) 30 µl of 10% (51 joules)  and the 
Concentration decoy option (DC) 10 µl of 30% (55 joules). Lines are isoclines of equal 
energy. 
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Table 1. 
Option Volume (µl) 
Concentration 
(% sucrose brix) Joules 
Concentration 20 40 154.99 
Volume  40 20 142.48 
Concentration 
decoy 10 30 55.69 
Volume decoy 30 10 51.23 
Alternative 
Concentration 20 35 132.79 
 
Table 1.  The energetic value in joules of the sucrose contained in one well of each 
option. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Subjects and study site 
The subjects were 11 wild male Rufous hummingbirds defending feeding territories in 
a valley in the Eastern Range of the Rocky Mountains  (49º 21’N, 114º 25’W, 
elevation 1400m), Alberta, Canada. All work was approved by the University of St 
Andrews Ethical Committee, conducted according to the requirements of the Canadian 
Chapter 2                                                                                                                     30 
 
 
Council on Animal Care and under permits from Environment Canada and the Alberta 
Sustainable Resource Development Fish and Wildlife division.  
In mid-May, commercial hummingbird feeders containing 14% sucrose were 
placed in potential territories and by late May most feeders were defended by males.  
These territorial males were individually marked by applying a small amount of 
waterproof, non-toxic ink to their breasts.  The data were collected in May-July 2009 
between 8:00 and 19:00 hours Mountain Standard Time. 
 
Training 
The subjects were initially trained to feed from a small Plexiglas board containing 
three wells (10 mm deep, 3.5 mm in diameter) in a triangular formation set on a stake 
80cm tall. The edge of each well was marked with a yellow paper reinforcement ring.  
The wells were filled with 25% sucrose, a concentration that was not used again in this 
experiment.  Once the bird had fed from any of the wells in the board the feeder was 
removed. After each visit made by the bird to the board, the board was rotated 90º and 
the volume of sucrose in each well was lowered until the wells all contained 50µl.  
Once the bird had fed from each of the wells, this stage of the training was complete.  
The small Plexiglas was then replaced with a larger Plexiglas board (28 cm x 
21.5 cm x 1.2 cm) containing 18 wells (10 mm deep, 3.5 mm in diameter) that could 
hold a maximum of 120µl. These wells were arranged in an offset pattern with each 
well 5.2cm from each of its nearest neighbours. All of the wells were marked with 
yellow reinforcements and all contained 50µl of 25% sucrose solution (see appendix 
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figures 1 and 2).  The board was initially parallel to the ground but each time the bird 
fed from the board the angle of the board was tilted by approximately 10º until it 
reached an angle of 45º. After each visit the board was rotated through 90º. Rotating 
the board changes the spatial arrangement of the wells, which means that birds can 
only learn the contents of the wells by the colour of the ring rather than the spatial 
location of the wells. Once the board had been rotated four times training was 
considered complete and the experiment proper began. Training took approximately 
two hours. All birds that completed training successfully progressed to the experiment. 
 
Experimental manipulation 
For the experiment, we used the larger Plexiglas boards described above. The wells 
were marked with coloured reinforcement rings to indicate the contents of the well. 
The board was mounted on a stake ca. 80 cm high at a 45° angle.  Birds were pseudo 
randomly assigned to either the Treatment One or Treatment Two.   
 
Treatment One 
In this treatment (essentially a replicate of Bateson et al. 2003), six birds were 
presented with one binary condition and two trinary conditions. The order of 
presentation was pseudo-randomised so that each order of presentation had 
approximately the same number of birds assigned to it. 
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In the Binary condition, we presented birds with a choice of two options: nine 
wells were randomly assigned to contain the Concentration option (20µl of 40% 
sucrose solution), and the remaining nine wells contained the Volume option (40µl of 
20% sucrose).  
 In the Volume decoy trinary condition, we presented birds with a choice of 
three options: six of the wells were randomly assigned to contain the Concentration 
option (20µl of 40% sucrose), six were randomly assigned to contain the Volume 
option (40µl of 20% sucrose), and the final six wells were assigned to contain the 
Volume decoy (30µl of 10% sucrose). 
In the Concentration decoy trinary condition, we presented birds with a choice 
of three options: one third of the wells were randomly assigned to contain the 
Concentration option (20µl of 40% sucrose), one third were randomly assigned to 
contain the Volume option (40µl of 20% sucrose), and the final third were assigned to 
contain the Concentration decoy (10µl of 30% sucrose).  
 
Treatment Two 
In this treatment, five birds were also presented with one binary condition and two 
trinary conditions. The order of presentation was pseudo-randomised so that each order 
of presentation had approximately the same number of birds assigned to it. 
 In the Binary condition, however, one of the two options presented to the birds 
differed from that presented in the first treatment: nine wells were randomly assigned 
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to contain the ‘Alternative’ Concentration option (20µl of 35% sucrose solution) and 
the remaining nine wells contained the Volume option (40µl of 20% sucrose).  
 In the Volume decoy trinary condition, birds were presented with a choice of 
three options: one third of the wells were randomly assigned to contain the Alternative 
Concentration option (20µl of 40%), one third were randomly assigned to contain the 
Volume option (40µl of 20% sucrose), and the final third were assigned to contain the 
Volume decoy (30µl of 10% sucrose). 
 In the Concentration decoy trinary condition, birds were presented with a 
choice of three options: one third of the wells were randomly assigned to contain the 
Alternative Concentration option (20µl of 35%), one third were randomly assigned to 
contain the Volume option (40µl of 20% sucrose), and the final third were assigned to 
contain the Concentration decoy (10µl of 30% sucrose). For the number of joules of 
energy per well contained in each option, see Table 1. 
 Each of the wells was marked with a coloured reinforcement indicating its 
contents. We used eight colours (blue, yellow, indigo, pink, red, green, violet and 
orange), using three new colours for each condition such that birds were required to 
relearn all of the colour associations for each condition.  
 During each visit to the board (a bout), the bird was allowed to feed from as 
many wells as he wished. For each bout, the number and type of wells that the bird fed 
from was recorded in addition to the time that the bout begun.  Once the bird had 
finished feeding and flown away, we emptied all wells from which he had fed using a 
capillary tube to determine the amount of sucrose remaining.  The emptied wells were 
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then refilled and the board rotated 90°.  After four bouts, the board was replaced with 
another board with a different random pattern of coloured wells.  A bird was allowed 
to visit 150 wells in each treatment. 
 As we wanted to determine which options the hummingbirds chose as well as 
the energetic content of those options, we measured preference in two ways. The first 
measure was the proportion of choices birds made to the option that offered the highest 
amount of energy per well (Equation 1; Appendix). In the first treatment this was the 
Concentration option and in the second treatment it was the Volume option (Equation 
2; Appendix). In the second measure for each bird we determined the option that had 
provided the most energy in the binary choice (using the volumes taken) and we 
looked at the change in preference for the option which was most rewarding for each 
bird (Equation 3; Appendix).  
 
Analysis  
So as to diminish the effects on preference of learning the contents of the wells we 
included only the last 75 well visits for each condition in the analyses.  Prior to 
analysis, these proportional data were transformed using an arcsine square root 
transformation.  Preference for option in the binary choices was with a one sample T. 
All the differences between conditions were calculated using repeated measures 
ANOVAs.  
 I also looked at the choices made by individual birds. To determine whether 
individual birds changed their preference when a decoy option was added, we used 
Chi-Squared tests to analyse their last 75 well visits of each choice set. In both 
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treatments the number of well visits to the Concentration/Alternative Concentration 
and Volume options in the binary choice sets was the expected number of well visits 
and the number of well visits to these same options in the trinary choice sets were the 
observed. If birds did not make visits to both Concentration/Alternative Concentration 
and Volume options in the last 75 well visits then their data could not be analysed. A 
sample of ten choice sets from ten different birds was analysed to look at the rate of 
revisiting. Of the ten conditions sampled, five birds revisited one well and one further 
bird revisited two wells 
 
Results 
Treatment One 
 There was a trend for birds to prefer (unless otherwise stated preference refers 
to the proportion of choices) the Concentration option in the binary choice (t(5) = 
1.805, p = 0.131) and their preference for this option  was not different after the 
addition of either the Volume Decoy (Dv) or the Concentration decoy (Dc) than it was 
in the binary choice set (Dv: F(2,10) = 0.411, p = 0.870; Dc: F(2,10) = 0.411, p = 
0.402; Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Concentration Treatment: Proportion of choices made to the Concentration 
option in the Binary, and the Concentration and Volume decoy added choices. Data are 
taken from the last 75 well visits and use choices to the Concentration and Volume 
options. The data are means ± s.e. (N=6).  
 
Treatment Two 
 The birds preferred the Alternative Concentration option in the binary choice 
(t(4) = 4.571, p = 0.010) and the addition of neither the Volume Decoy (Dv) nor the 
Concentration decoy (Dc) changed their preference (Dv: F(2,8) =0.2035, p = 0.878; 
Dc: F(2,8) = 0.2035, p = 0.776; Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Volume Treatment: Proportion of choices made to the Alternative 
Concentration options in the Binary, and the Concentration decoy and volume decoy 
added choices. Data are taken from the last 75 well visits and only use choices to the 
Alternative Concentration and Volume options. The data are means ± s.e. (N=5).  
 
Sucrose consumed  
In the binary condition of Treatment One, birds consumed, on average, the same 
amount of energy per well from the Concentration option as from the Volume option 
(t(5) = 1.989, p = 0.103).   In the binary condition of Treatment Two in the, there was a 
trend for birds to gain more energy per well when drinking from the Alternative 
Concentration wells than when drinking from the Volume wells (t(4) = 2.371, p = 
0.076) (for Joules acquired from each option see Table 2). 
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Table 1. 
Treatment 
Option Volume (µl) 
Concentration 
(% BRIX) 
Average number of 
joules per well 
Concentration Concentration 20 40 127.18 
Concentration Volume 40 20 92.07 
Volume Alternative 
concentration 20 35 142.48 
Volume Volume 40 20 100.96 
 
Table 1. The average energetic value in joules that birds consumed from each option in 
the binary condition. 
 
Data from individuals  
Treatment One 
When the Volume decoy was added to the choice set of the Concentration option and 
the Volume option, one bird decreased and three birds increased their preference for 
the Concentration Option (bird 5: c² (1) = 16.448, p < 0.001; bird 1: c² (1) = 45.512, p 
< 0.001; bird 3: c² (1) = 341.479, p < 0.001; bird 6: c² (1) = 341.479, p < 0.001), while 
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two birds did not change their preference (bird 2: c² (1) = 2.377, p = 0.123; bird 4: c² 
(1) = 1.014, p = 0.314; Figure 4).  
When the Concentration decoy was added to the choice set of the Volume and 
Concentration options, two birds decreased and three birds increased their preference 
for the Concentration option (bird 4: c² (1) = 17.231, p < 0.001; bird 5: c² (1) = 
390.507, p < 0.001; bird 1: c² (1) = 48.429, p < 0.001; bird 8: c² (1) = 221.110, p < 
0.001; bird 6: c² (1) = 174.866, p < 0.001) while one bird did not change his preference 
(bird 2: c² (1) = 0.430, p = 0.512; Figure 4).   
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Figure 4. Treatment One: Change in the proportion of choices to the Concentration 
option. A positive number indicates an increase in the preference for the Concentration 
option and a negative number indicates an increase in preference for the Volume 
option. Data are the final 75 well visits (N=6).  
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In sum, one bird (bird 5) decreased and three birds (birds 1, 3 and 6) increased 
their preference for the Concentration option when either the Volume or Concentration 
decoy was added to the choice set.  One bird made no change in response to the 
inclusion of either decoy.  
 
Treatment Two 
The addition of the Volume decoy caused one bird to increase its preference for the 
Volume option (bird 8: c² (1) = 154.854, p < 0.001), two birds decreased their 
preference for the Volume option (bird 9: c² (1) = 34.560, p < 0.001; bird 10: c² (1 ) = 
11.259, p = 0.001), one bird did not change his preference (bird 7: c² (1) = 2.663, p = 
0.103) and the fifth bird (bird 11) failed to sample one of the options at all in the last 
75 choices so we did not analyse his data (Figure 5).  
When the Concentration decoy was added, two birds increased their preference 
for the Volume option (bird 7: c² (1) = 32.244, p < 0.001; bird 8: c² (1) = 32.426, p < 
0.001), one bird reduced his preference for the Volume option (bird 9: c² (1) = 21.607, 
p < 0.001) and two birds did not change preference (bird 10: c² (1) = 0.544, p = 0.461; 
bird 5: c² (1) = 0.414, p = 0.520; Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Treatment Two: Change in the proportion of choices to the Alternative 
Concentration option. A positive number indicates an increase in the preference for the 
Alternative Concentration option and a negative number indicates an increase in 
preference for the Volume option. Data are the final 75 well visits (N=5).  
 
The preference changes of two of the birds were independent of the kind of 
decoy: bird 8 increased his preference for the Volume wells irrespective of decoy type 
while bird 9 decreased its preference for the Volume option irrespective of decoy type.  
Birds 7 and 10 responded to only one decoy (Volume and Concentration, respectively) 
while bird 11 responded to the inclusion of neither decoy. 
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Preference for the option with the largest experienced energy 
If the birds drank all of the contents of each well, the Volume Option provided the 
highest energetic return in the Volume Treatment while in the Concentration 
Treatment the Concentration option should have been the most rewarding. As each 
bird varied in the amount of sucrose he removed from each well type, we redid the 
analyses above using the preference for the option from which each bird acquired the 
most joules (Equation 3, Appendix). For each bird, the most profitable option was 
taken to be the option from which the birds removed the highest number of joules per 
well in the binary choice set.  
In Treatment One, in the binary choice four birds gained the largest number of 
joules per well from the Concentration option (birds 2, 3, 5 and 6) and two birds 
gained the most energy per well from the Volume option (birds 1 and 4). In response 
to the addition of either the Concentration or Volume Decoy to the choice set two birds 
increased their preference for the option from which they had gained the highest 
energetic return (bird 3: Dv: c² (1) = 341.479, p < 0.001;  Dc: c² (1) = 221.110, p < 
0.001; bird 6 Dv: c² (1) = 341.479, p < 0.001; Dc: c² (1) = 174.866, p < 0.001) while 
two birds decreased their preference for that option (bird 5: Dv: c² (1) = 16.448, p < 
0.001; Dc: c² (1) = 390.507, p < 0.001; bird 1: Dv: c² (1) = 45.512, p < 0.001; Dc: c² 
(1) = 48.429, p < 0.001). One bird decreased its preference for the option with the most 
energy only when the Concentration decoy was added (bird 4: Dcc² (1) = 17.231, p < 
0.001; Dv c² (1) = 1.014, p = 0.314).  The sixth bird (bird 2) did not respond to the 
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addition of either the Volume or Concentration decoy to the choice set (Dv: c² (1) = 
2.377, p = 0.123; Dc: c² (1) 0.430, p = 0.512).   
In Treatment Two, all birds gained the largest volume of energy per well from 
the Alternative Concentration option.   One bird increased his preference from which 
he had gained most energy (the Alternative concentration option) in response to the 
addition of either the Volume or Concentration decoy to the choice set (bird 9: Dv: c² 
(1) = 34.560, p < 0.001; Dc: c² (1) = 21.607, p < 0.001) while another bird (bird 10) 
increased his preference for the option with the highest energy only in response to the 
addition of the Volume decoy (bird 10: Dv: c² (1 ) = 11.259, p = 0.001; Dc: c² (1) = 
0.544, p = 0.461). Bird 8 decreased its preference for the option with the most energy 
in response to either the Concentration or Volume decoy being added to the choice set 
(bird 8 Dc: c² (1) = 32.426, p < 0.001) while bird 1 only did so in response to the 
Concentration Decoy being added to the choice set (bird 7: Dc: c² (1) = 32.244, p < 
0.001; Dv: c² (1) = 2.663, p = 0.103). Bird 11 did not respond to the addition of the 
Concentration decoy to the choice set (bird 11 Dc- c² (1) = 0.414, p = 0.520). His 
choice for the options when the Volume decoy was added could not be analysed as this 
bird failed to sample one of the options at all in the last 75 choices.   
 
Discussion 
Overall, the birds’ preferences for one option over another in the binary choice set did 
not change when an inferior decoy option was added to that choice set. Individually, 
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however, birds’ preferences did change although those changes were not consistent 
across birds within a treatment or dependent on the value of the decoy.  
 I conducted this experiment to distinguish between two possible explanations 
for the responses made by foraging hummingbirds to the inclusion of poorer decoy 
options to a choice set observed in several previous experiments (Bateson et al. 2002, 
2003, Morgan et al. 2012).  If hummingbirds make decisions based on their energetic 
state, in the presence of either inferior decoy option the birds should have increased 
their preference for the option from which they would gain the largest energetic return 
(Schuck-Paim et al., 2004).   While a few of the birds did make changes that were 
somewhat consistent with this possibility, energy return does not explain most of the 
changes in the birds’ preferences in response to the decoys.  This variability in 
response was seen also when we measured, not the promise of energy return, but what 
the birds actually gained: this measure shows that most birds responded to the decoys 
but not in a way that is explained by energetic intake. Hummingbirds are considered to 
be net rate maximisers (Hixon, 1982, DeBenedictis et al., 1978) so an alternative 
energetic explanation is that the birds were acting to maximise their net rate of energy 
intake. If this were the case birds would be predicted to take almost exclusively from 
the option with the highest caloric pay off (which may be different for each bird). In 
addition once learning has occurred birds would be expected to choose that option 
only. However, birds do not exclusively choose one of the options even though they 
were able to as the average number of wells visited was lower than the amount of wells 
of each type in the trinary choice sets. 
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 However, the alternative explanation for a response to the addition of decoys to 
the choice set was that if the birds were using a comparative choice mechanism their 
preferences should have changed in response to the inclusion of an asymmetrically 
dominating decoy (in this case the Concentration and Volume decoys) by increasing 
their preference for the option to which that decoy is most similar (Bateman et al., 
2008, Colman et al., 2007, Doyle et al., 1999). Although there were birds that did 
respond in this way, they were not the majority.  
 The lack of systematic results in this experiment points to another possibility, 
that the decoy effect does not produce systematic changes in the preference of 
hummingbirds. Instead their changes in preference could be seen as mistakes rather 
than the systematic changes in preference which would be predicted from a shared 
decision making mechanism. If this were the case then the hummingbirds would be 
economically rational and further experiments looking at the decoy effect would be 
unlikely to lead to a greater understanding of their decision making. It is also plausible 
that rather than mistakes the problem lies with our simplistic assumption that birds use 
the cues offered by the options in equal measure.  If, for example, the hummingbirds 
do not pay equal attention to both the concentration and volume of the option and birds 
differ in the weight they give to different components of an option (e.g. preferring 
concentration over volume), we would expect that individual birds would change their 
preferences in response to the addition of decoys but not in the same way.  One way to 
simplify the examination of the effects of poor decoys on choice is to use options that 
vary in a single dimension only (Morgan et al. 2012).  However, even this 
methodological change is not, in itself, sufficient as shown by the lack of reliable 
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response to the inclusion of poorer decoys to choice sets in the single-dimension 
experiment carried out by Morgan et al. (2012).  In order to see whether there are 
situations in which hummingbirds are making consistent economically irrational 
choices or if the choices they make are more consistent with rationality, more tests of 
the effects of poorer options on preference for favourable options are needed.  
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Chapter 3: Context-dependent decision making in a single dimension: inferior 
options make a difference 
Introduction 
Animals should make choices which maximise their fitness. One possible way 
of achieving this would be by assigning all options a value based on the benefit 
conveyed to the animal and then choosing the option with the highest value 
independent of the poorer options available. However we know this is sometimes not 
the case as some animals change their preference upon the addition of inferior options 
to a choice set (Bateson et al., 2003, Latty and Beekman, 2011, Morgan et al., 2012, 
Scarpi, 2011, Shafir et al., 2002, Stroeymeyt et al., 2011). However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, in order to determine what mechanism is causing these changes in 
preference, it is necessary that preferences can consistently and reliably be obtained, 
both within and among individuals, which they are often not (Bateson et al., 2002, 
Bateson et al., 2003, Shafir, 1994, Waite, 2001b). 
One explanation for the differences in the way animals respond to the addition 
of inferior options to a choice sets may be, in part, due to the nature of the options the 
animals are offered.  In the experiments with animals, options typically vary in more 
than one dimension (Bateson et al., 2002, Bateson et al., 2003, Latty and Beekman, 
2011, Shafir, 1994, Shafir et al., 2002, Waite, 2001b). If the animals pay attention to or 
prefer one dimension over another but do not all prefer the same dimension, this could 
lead to variation in their responses to inferior options. In order to develop an 
appropriate experimental paradigm for examining these possibilities, we presented 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                        48 
 
 
wild, free-ranging foraging hummingbirds with a choice set in which the options 
varied in a single dimension only.   
Birds were presented with two favourable options with values of 20 & 30, 
which differed in either concentration (%) or in volume (µl). To these binary choice 
sets, we added either an option that was slightly poorer (15 µl or %) or an option that 
was much poorer (5 µl or %).  If the birds make economically rational decisions, their 
choice of the more favourable option should not change in response to the addition of 
either poorer option.  However, there are two ways in which the birds’ choices may 
change in response to the presence of an inferior option.  The first is based on 
energetic intake.  Drinking from either of the poorer options would be expected to lead 
to the birds increasing their intake of the 30 option relative to the 20 option in order to 
take in the same amount of energy.  If this was the case, then we would expect the 
inclusion of the 15 option to increase preference for the 30 over the 20 option relative 
to the preference for 30 seen in the binary choice set, and for the inclusion of the 5 
option to increase that preference for 30 even more. The second possibility is that the 
birds make their choices based on the relative difference among the options.  In this 
case, the 15 option is more similar to the 20 than the 30. Therefore the 30 option 
appears to be better relative to the 20 option than when the birds had had only the 20 
and 30 options to choose between. The birds would, then, be expected to take more of 
the 30 option in the presence of the 15 option than in the binary choice. The addition of 
the 5 option, on the other hand, would cause the 20 and 30 options to appear more 
similar to each other than in the binary choice. In this context, we would expect the 
birds to decrease their preference for the 30 option in the presence of the 5 option 
relative to their preference for the 30 option in the binary context. 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                        49 
 
 
Materials and Methods 
Subjects and study site 
The subjects were five wild male rufous hummingbirds defending territories in the 
Westcastle Valley in the eastern range of the Rocky Mountains (49° 21’N, 114° 25’W, 
elevation 1400m), Alberta, Canada.  Territorial males were individually marked by a 
small application of non-toxic, waterproof ink to the breast feathers.  The experiment 
was conducted from 7:00 to 20:00 hours Mountain Standard Time between May-July 
in 2010.   
 This work was approved by the University of St Andrews Ethical Committee, 
conducted according to the requirements of the Canadian Council on Animal Care and 
was carried out under permits from Environment Canada and the Alberta Sustainable 
Resource Development Fish and Wildlife Division.  
 
Experimental procedure 
Training 
The subjects were initially trained to feed from a small Plexiglas board containing 
three wells (10 mm deep, 3.5 mm in diameter) in a triangular formation set on a stake 
80cm tall. The edge of each well was marked with a yellow paper reinforcement ring.  
The wells were filled with 25% sucrose, a concentration that was not used again in this 
experiment.  Once the bird had fed from any of the wells in the board the feeder was 
removed. After each visit made by the bird to the board, the board was rotated 90º and 
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the volume of sucrose in each well was lowered until the wells all contained 50µl.  
Once the bird had fed from each of the wells, this stage of the training was complete.  
The small Plexiglas was then replaced with a larger Plexiglas board (28 cm x 
21.5 cm x 1.2 cm) containing 18 wells (10 mm deep, 3.5 mm in diameter) that could 
hold a maximum of 120µl. These wells were arranged in an offset pattern with each 
well 5.2cm from each of its nearest neighbours. All of the wells were marked with 
yellow reinforcements and all contained 50µl of 25% sucrose solution.  The board was 
initially parallel to the ground but each time the bird fed from the board the angle of 
the board was tilted by approximately 10º until it reached an angle of 45º. After each 
visit the board was rotated through 90º. Rotating the board changes the spatial 
arrangement of the wells, which means that birds can only learn the contents of the 
wells by the colour of the ring rather than the spatial location of the wells. Once the 
board had been rotated four times training was considered complete and the 
experiment proper began. Training took approximately two hours.  
 
Experimental manipulation 
For the experiment, we used the larger Plexiglas boards described above. The wells 
were marked with coloured reinforcement rings to indicate the contents of the well. 
The board was mounted on a stake ca. 80 cm high at a 45° angle.  
 There were two treatments, in the Volume Treatment options varied only in 
volume and in the Concentration Treatment options varied only in concentration. Each 
bird completed both the Volume and Concentration Treatments. Two birds completed 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                        51 
 
 
the Concentration Treatment first and three birds completed the Volume treatment 
first. In both the Volume and Concentration Treatments birds had a binary choice set 
and two trinary choice sets. In binary choice sets half of the wells were randomly 
assigned to contain each option and in trinary choice sets a third of the wells were 
randomly assigned to contain each option.  
 In both the Concentration and the Volume Treatments the binary choice set 
consisted of options with values of 20 and 30.  For the Concentration Treatment, birds 
were presented with options of 20% and 30% sucrose and in the Volume Treatment, 
the choice was between 20µl and 30µl. There were also two trinary choice sets: one 
consisted of 15, 20 and 30 (% in the Concentration Treatment and µl in the Volume 
treatment), while the other consisted of 5, 20 and 30 options (% in the Concentration 
Treatment and µl in the Volume treatment; Figure 1). The order of presentation was 
counterbalanced across the five birds.  In the Concentration Treatment, all of the 
options had a volume of 30µl. In the Volume Treatment all of the options had a 
concentration of 20%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                        52 
 
 
Figure 1. 
Concentration (%)
V
o
lu
m
e
 (

l)
0 10 20 30 40
0
10
20
30
40
Volume
Both
Concentration
 
Figure 1. 
Volumes and concentrations of the options we presented to the birds. The open squares 
indicate options presented in the Concentration Treatment: a binary choice between the 
20% and 30% options, as well as two trinary options in which the birds were presented 
with a choice set of 5%, 20% and 30% as well as the choice set of 15%, 20% and 30%.  
The black squares indicate options that birds were presented with in the Volume 
Treatment: a binary choice between the 20µl and 30µl options, as well as two trinary 
options where birds had a choice set of 5µl, 20µl and 30µl and 15µl, 20µl and 30µl. 
There is one option in each of the treatments with the same volume and concentration; 
which is indicated by a half black square. For both Volume and Concentration 
treatments options which are present in all the choices in that treatment are indicated 
by larger squares than options which are only present in a trinary choice.  
 
Each option was indicated to the bird by the colour of paper reinforcement ring 
placed around the well. Eight colours were used green, navy, purple, sky blue, pink, 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                        53 
 
 
red, yellow and orange. Within each treatment a bird had one binary choice set and 
two trinary choice sets. For each of these choice sets there was a new set of colours so 
that the birds had to relearn all the colour associations afresh in each choice set.  
 When a bird visited the board he was allowed to feed from as many wells as he 
wished. Once he had left the board any sucrose remaining in the wells was measured 
using a 20µl pipette. The empty wells were then refilled and the board was rotated 
through 90º. After four visits, the board was replaced with another board on which a 
different set of wells were randomly assigned to contain each option. Moving the 
board and changing the spatial arrangement of the wells’ contents was to ensure that 
the birds learned the contents of the wells by the colour of the assigned ring rather than 
by the spatial location of the wells.  
 On two occasions a bird failed to sample every flower type within the first 10 
visits to the board.  When this occurred we forced him to drink the missed option by 
presenting him with a board containing only the unsampled option.  
Each choice set was considered complete when a bird had visited 100 wells.  
Birds usually took less than a day to visit 100 wells.   
 
Data Analysis 
To determine whether there were changes in the preference for the 20% and 30% 
options in the Concentration Treatment and the 20µl and 30µl options in the Volume 
Treatment I looked at the proportion of choices that birds made to their preferred 
option in the binary choice set and then compared that preference to the choices to that 
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option in the two trinary choice sets. I calculated the birds’ preferences in all choice 
sets across both the Volume and the Concentration Treatments by dividing the number 
of choices to the preferred option by the total number of choices to both the 20 and 30 
options.  
As some of the early visits to the wells were likely to be when the birds were 
learning about options, we analysed only the final 50 well visits for each condition. We 
calculated the choices to the preferred option in two ways: (1) by using all of the 
choices that the bird made in the final 50 well visits; and (2) by using only the data for 
the first three well visits in each bout. Taking the first three well visits allows us to 
assess preference before the number of wells of each option becomes limited (in the 
trinary choice sets there were only six wells for each option). Only 2 birds made any 
revisits to a well they had already emptied. These revisits were not counted and 
occurred twice or less per condition. As the data were not normally distributed, all 
proportions were transformed using an arcsine-square-root transformation. I used 
paired T-Tests to compare preferences in each of the trinary conditions to the 
preference in the binary condition and repeated-measures ANOVAs to look at the 
volume of sucrose birds consumed in each choice set. All statistics were calculated in 
PASW statistics version 18.  
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Results 
Concentration Treatment 
Using all of the data from the last 50 choices, when the 5% option was added to the 
choice set of 20% and 30% options, birds chose the 30%  option less frequently than 
they had chosen it in the binary choice context (t(4) = 3.260, p = 0.031; Figure 2). 
When a 15% option was added to the choice set of 20% and 30% birds did not change 
their preference (t(4) = -0.563, p = 0.604). We saw similar effects when we used only 
the data from the first three well visits that birds made in each bout (5%: t(4) = - 2.933, 
p = 0.043; 15%: t(4) = -0.487, p = 0.652). For number of each option selected in each 
choice set see Figure 1; appendix.  
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Figure 2. The mean (± s.e.) proportion of choices which birds made to their preferred 
option in the trinary and binary choices of the Concentration treatment. For each bird 
the preferred option was the option which they chose most in the binary choice. All 
birds preferred the 30% option in the binary choice set. The data are means ± s.e. (N = 
5) from the last 50 well visits. The asterisk indicates significance at p ≤ 0.05. 
 
Volume Treatment  
Using all of the data from the last 50 choices, when the 5µl decoy was added to the 
choice set of 20µl and 30µl, birds decreased the number of choices made to their 
preferred option from the binary choice set (t(4) = -4.530, p = 0.011; Figure 3). Birds 
did not change their preference in response to the addition of the 15µl decoy to the 
choice set of 20µl and 30µl (t(4) = -0.541, p = 0.617). We saw similar effects when 
only the data for the first three choices of each bout were analysed (5µl: t (4) = -2.725, 
p = 0.053; 15µl: t (4) = 0.791, p = 0.473). For number of choices birds made to each 
option in each of the choices sets see Figure 2; appendix. 
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Figure 3. The mean (± s.e.) proportion of choices which birds made to their preferred 
option in the trinary and binary choices of the Volume Treatment. For each bird the 
preferred option was the option which they chose most in the binary choice. For four 
birds this preferred option was the 20µl option and for one bird the preferred option 
was the 30µl option. The data are means ± s.e. (N = 5) for the final 50 well visits. The 
asterisk indicates significance at p ≤ 0.05. 
 
Volume of sucrose remaining 
I also measured the volume of sucrose remaining in the wells after birds had visited 
them. In the Concentration Treatment, the birds drank a similar volume  of sucrose 
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from the 30% wells in all of the binary and trinary choice sets (F(2,8) = 1.601, p = 
0.260). Birds also consumed a similar volume of sucrose from each of the 20% wells 
in all of the choice set (F(2,8) = 0.868, p = 0.456; Figure 3, appendix). Birds did not 
visit a different number of wells per bout in the binary and trinary choice sets of the 
concentration treatment (F(2,8) = 2.930, p = 0.111) (see Appendix Figure 4). In 
addition birds did not significantly differ in the number of bouts which theytook to 
complete the choice sets (F(2,8) = 3.173, p = 0.0967). There was no difference in the 
numbers of grams of sugar birds consumed per minute in the different choice sets 
(F(2,8) = 2.082, p = 0.187. Figure 5, Appendix). In the Volume Treatment, I can be 
confident that birds experienced the differences in Volume as birds consumed an 
average 94.7% of the sucrose provided in each well that they visited (Figure 6, 
Appendix) and birds took different volumes of sucrose in each of the choice sets 
(Figure 7, Appendix). The amount of sugar which birds consumed per minute was 
altered by the addition of inferior options. Birds in the 5µl choice set consumed more 
sugar per minute than they did in the binary choice sets (F(2,8) = 7.761, p = 0.032. 
Figure 8, Appendix). The amount of sugar that birds consumed per minute was not 
significantly different in binary and 15µl conditions (F(2,8) = 7.761, p = 0.120). 
  
Discussion 
In both the Volume and the Concentration Treatments, the addition of a very poor 
option (5µl or %) to a choice set of options with values of 20 and 30 (% or µl) led to 
all of the birds reducing their preference for their favoured option. The addition of a 
slightly poorer option (15µl or %) did not, however, affect the birds’ choices. In the 
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Volume Treatment 4 of the 5 birds preferred the smaller 20µl option. In the presence 
of the 5µl option birds decreased the proportion of choices made to this option, 
choosing the 30µl option more frequently. Birds took in more sugar per minute in the 
5µl choice set than they did in the Binary choice. The presence of the 15µl option did 
not change the proportion of choices which birds made to the options. In the 
Concentration Treatment all birds chose the 30% option most frequently in the binary 
choice. When the 5% option was added to the choice birds decreased the proportion of 
choices which they made to the 30% option. Birds did not change the proportion of 
choices they made to the options when the 15% option was added to the options. The 
addition of the poorer decoy options did not change the amount of energy per minute 
that the birds consumed in the Concentration Treatment.  These data firstly support our 
prediction that birds’ preference for two favourable options would be affected by the 
addition of a poor option.  Secondly, these data support our prediction that the change 
in response as a result of the addition of an inferior option would depend on the value 
of that inferior option.  These data provide two key additions to attempts to understand 
whether or not animals make economically rational decisions: (1) the birds all made 
the same kind of (irrational) response to the addition of a poor decoy option to a choice 
set; (2) economically irrational choices were biologically rational as they were not 
necessarily poorer than the behaviour we would have expected if the birds had been 
economically rational.  
Experiments which have found economically irrational decisions have often 
not found consistent changes in preference across individuals (Bateson et al., 2002, 
Shafir, 1994). If animals are economically rational then we would expect that the 
animals would not change their preference in the presence of a poor value option. 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                        60 
 
 
Whereas, if animals are using a common decision rule which is suitable for their 
environment we would expect that changes in preference would be consistent across 
individuals. Without predictable responses, it is difficult to determine whether the 
changes in preference could be a mistake on the part of individuals or if there is a 
decision making mechanism that is  underpinning the changes in preference.  It 
appears from our data that presenting options that vary in one dimension only may 
provide a powerful tool for addressing the rationality of decision making in animals.  
Not only did the birds make consistent choices in response to the poor decoy within a 
dimension (i.e. either sucrose concentration or sucrose volume), they all made the 
same kind of response across those dimensions. As all birds changed their preference 
in the same way it seems likely that there is a common process underlying these 
changes in preference.  
The addition of a poor quality decoy to a choice set requires the animal to 
assess that option by drinking it and unless the animal takes the decoy in addition to 
the other options it would normally choose, that animal would reduce its energy intake 
by drinking the poorer option.  It has been argued that changes in energy state could be 
responsible for some of the apparently irrational decision making we see in animals 
(Schuck-Paim et al., 2004). The birds did have to sample the poor decoys to learn 
about them.  However, once the birds had learned the value of the 5 option, which they 
did within a handful of visits, the birds rarely chose this option again although the 
effect of the presence of that option was both immediate and relatively long-lasting (to 
our limit of 100 well visits, which took about a day), well beyond any immediate 
energetic deficit that would have been imposed by the intake of the 5 option.  
Furthermore, the effect was that the birds reduced their intake of their preferred option.  
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This effect is most clearly seen and interpreted in the Concentration Treatment, 
whereby the birds preferred 30% over 20% in the binary condition but reduced that 
preference for 30% in the presence of 5%.    
In the Volume Treatment four of the five birds preferred the 20µl option over 
the 30µl option in the binary choice set. In addition, they did not appear to consider the 
15µl option to be a poor decoy option either as when 15µl was presented alongside the 
20µl and the 30µl options, they preferred 15µl as much as they did 20µl, and chose 
30µl option least (Figure 2, Appendix). Birds left very little (less than 5%) in each well 
so it is clear that they must have experienced the different volumes of sucrose. It is not 
clear why in the binary choices birds would prefer the 20µl option as this provides a 
lower volume of sucrose than the 30µl option. Therefore if birds were trying to acquire 
a certain volume of sucrose or a particular amount of energy per bout birds would have 
to visit more wells to achieve this. Although the inclusion of the 15 option did not 
increase the preference for the 30 option (as would be expected by an energetic 
explanation), if the birds used a relative assessment of the options, the inclusion of a 
15 option would be expected to cause the 30 option to seem less like the 20 option and 
this does seem to have been the outcome: in both dimensions, the birds differentiated 
very little between the 15 and 20 options.  This is surprising, given both the energetic 
difference between the two and that these birds can readily distinguish the difference 
between 15 and 20 value options (Blem et al., 2000, Morgan et al., 2012, Tamm and 
Gass, 1986).  All in all, it seems very unlikely that the changes in preference are 
caused by changes to the nutritional state of animals caused by sampling the ‘poor’ 
options.  
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Not only do our data show, for the first time, firstly, consistent responses to the 
addition to choice sets of poorer decoy options across birds and, secondly, that changes 
in energetic state do not account for those changes, we can also begin to distinguish 
amongst possible alternative mechanistic explanations for the birds’ choices.  There 
are, broadly, two classes of mechanism, one in which the birds can determine exactly 
the value of each option and choose accordingly (which could include ignoring that 
difference) and the other where the birds use a relative assessment of the options (e.g. 
one is sweeter/better than the other without an assessment of the actual value of the 
option).  As hummingbirds can distinguish between the concentrations we used in this 
experiment, it could be that the hummingbirds do know the exact value of each of the 
options but choose not to act on this information.  However, taken as a whole our data 
would seem to support the latter possibility more strongly, i.e. that, instead of making 
an assessment of the absolute value of the options, hummingbirds are instead making 
choices based on a relative assessment of the options available. So, as a very poor 
option is added to the choice set, the difference between the two good options seems 
less than it was when the poor option was not present. Mechanistically a relative 
assessment could be made in at least two ways, either at a perceptual level or at a later 
stage in information processing (Louie and Glimcher, 2012). Which (if not both) of 
these two processes is responsible for the changes in preference will be difficult to 
discriminate.  
Whether or not we will eventually be able to determine whether irrational 
decisions are based on perceptual or cognitive mechanisms, we suggest that the single 
dimension paradigm we describe here is likely to be a productive step forward in the 
determination of the mechanisms of choice by animals.  
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Chapter 4: Context-dependent decision making in a single dimension: prior 
experience does not change preferences 
 
Introduction 
It is clear that the decision-making context can change the choices that animals make 
contrary to the predictions of rational choice theory. In Chapters 2 and 3 3 the local 
context (the options available at the time of the choice) changed the decisions made by 
hummingbirds. In Chapter 2 this was individual hummingbirds changing their 
preferences but those changes were not consistent over individuals, whereas in Chapter 
3 the changes in preference were consistent across individuals. Previous experiments 
have also demonstrated that the local context can change the choices made by animals. 
For example, when inferior options are added to choice sets, animals will change their 
preferences for the favourable options (Bateson et al., 2002, Bateson et al., 2003, 
Hurly and Oseen, 1999, Latty and Beekman, 2011, Morgan et al., 2012, Shafir et al., 
2002).  In experiments where cats are presented with food choices, the presence of 
option that they can smell but not eat changes their feeding preferences (Scarpi, 2011). 
Previous experience, or the background context, can also influence the choices that 
animals make. For example, in starlings the energy state that the animal experienced 
when learning about an option can change the preference an animal has for that option 
in future choices: options that were experienced by starlings in poor condition were 
considered more favourably than would be expected from their energetic value when 
the starlings re-encountered them (Marsh et al., 2004, Pompilio et al., 2006). 
Background context also affected the choices made by jays, where the cost (in this 
case, the theoretical predation risk) required to obtain an item in previous choices 
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influenced the cost they were willing to pay to acquire that option in subsequent trials 
(Waite, 2001a).  
In humans (who also make irrational choices) there have been various 
explanations suggested to explain violations of rationality. These include constraints 
on the decision maker in time, on their cognitive capacity, or on their perceptual 
systems as well as the use of decision-making strategies such as rules of thumb 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999, Scheibehenne et al., 2007, Simon, 1997, Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). To understand why violations of rationality in animals may occur, 
we need first to determine the contexts in which they occur.   
Here we aimed to examine the effect of local (options available at the time of the 
choice) and previous context on the decisions of foraging hummingbirds. Although 
hummingbirds make choices that are changed by the local context, changes that 
depend on the options present at the time of the choice, irrespective of whether the 
options vary in two dimensions (concentration and volume: (Bateson et al., 2002, 
Bateson et al., 2003), in a single dimension (concentration or volume: (Morgan et al., 
2012) or differ in their variability (Hurly and Oseen, 1999), it is not clear whether 
background context (previous experience) has similar effects. Certainly the previous 
energetic intake of hummingbirds changes the degree to which the birds are risk 
averse: hummingbirds that experienced favourable background contexts were more 
risk averse than were birds that experienced a less favourable background context 
(Bacon et al., 2010). However, as in that experiment energetic state was explicitly 
manipulated, those data do not demonstrate that background context leads to irrational 
decision-making. 
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Aside from changes brought about by energy intake we know little about the way 
in which the experience of options in previous contexts may affect the future foraging 
preferences of hummingbirds. This is because in previous experiments in which the 
design is such that the birds are presented with a binary choice set and a trinary choice 
set in which the order of presentation is counterbalanced and the options for both 
choice sets are represented by different colours (even though the two options in the 
binary choice set occur in the trinary choice set), birds had to relearn all of the colour 
associations for each new choice set (Bateson et al., 2002, Bateson et al., 2003, Hurly 
and Oseen, 1999, Morgan et al., 2012). A consequence of this methodology is that it is 
not clear whether the choices the hummingbirds make are affected by knowledge of 
those options acquired in previous contexts.  
To examine whether background context can change preferences, we attempted 
to manipulate the birds’ knowledge of options without changing their energetic state. 
In order to do this, birds were split into two treatment groups and presented with three 
choice sets, consisting of the same options occurring in the same order (binary 
followed by trinary followed by binary). For each choice set, the options were 
identified by a colour. The difference between the treatments was that in one, the 
colours of the options in the first binary choice set matched those of the same options 
in the trinary choice set (Trinary Matched; Figure 1) and in the other, the colours of the 
options in the first binary choice set did not match those of the same options in the 
trinary choice set (Binary Matched).  Both sets of birds, then, faced a trinary choice set 
having experienced the same favourable options (20% and 30% sucrose solution) 
alongside a new, much poorer option (5% sucrose solution).  
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I predict that birds will use prior information to inform their decisions and as 
such birds which have experienced options previously (as the colours are matched) 
will make different choices to birds without the experience of the options. If birds use 
prior information to inform their decisions in future contexts I would expect that when 
the colours of the options are matched birds would use the information that they had 
already learned and so make more choices to the 30% option than when the colours are 
unmatched. I would also predict that if birds change their preference in the trinary 
choice as a result of the addition of the poor 5% option (as they did in Chapter 3) that 
this change in preference would be greater when the colours are unmatched as these 
birds must relearn all of the colour associations and so may attend to local context 
more than birds with prior information.  
 
Methods 
Subjects and study site 
The subjects were 12 wild male rufous hummingbirds defending feeding territories in a 
valley in the Eastern Range of the Rocky Mountains  (49º 35’N, 114º 41’W, elevation 
1400m), Alberta, Canada.  The data were collected between May-July 2011. In mid-
May commercial hummingbird feeders containing 14% sucrose were placed in 
potential territories and by late May most feeders were defended by males.  These 
territorial males were individually marked by applying a small amount of waterproof, 
non-toxic ink to their breasts. The marks had faded by the time by the birds migrated 
in mid-July.  
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Experimental procedure 
Training 
The subjects were initially trained to feed from a small Plexiglas board containing 
three wells (10 mm deep, 3.5 mm in diameter) in a triangular formation set on a stake 
80cm tall. The edge of each well was marked with a yellow paper reinforcement ring.  
The wells were filled with 25% sucrose, a concentration that was not used again in this 
experiment.  Once the bird had fed from any of the wells in the board the feeder was 
removed. After each visit made by the bird to the board, the board was rotated 90º and 
the volume of sucrose in each well was lowered until the wells all contained 50µl.  
Once the bird had fed from each of the wells, this stage of the training was complete.  
The small Plexiglas was then replaced with a larger Plexiglas board (28 cm x 
21.5 cm x 1.2 cm) containing 18 wells (10 mm deep, 3.5 mm in diameter) that could 
hold a maximum of 120µl. These wells were arranged in an offset pattern with each 
well 5.2cm from each of its nearest neighbours. All of the wells were marked with 
yellow reinforcements and all contained 50µl of 25% sucrose solution.  The board was 
initially parallel to the ground but each time the bird fed from the board the angle of 
the board was tilted by approximately 10º until it reached an angle of 45º. After each 
visit the board was rotated through 90º. Rotating the board changes the spatial 
arrangement of the wells, which means that birds can only learn the contents of the 
wells by the colour of the ring rather than the spatial location of the wells. Once the 
board had been rotated four times training was considered complete and the 
experiment proper began. Training took approximately two hours.  
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Experimental manipulation 
For the experiment, we used the larger Plexiglas boards described above. The wells 
were marked with coloured reinforcement rings to indicate the contents of the well. 
The board was mounted on a stake ca. 80 cm high at a 45° angle.   
There were two experimental treatments with each choice set consisting of three 
choice sets, a binary choice set (30µl of 20% or 30% sucrose solution) followed by a 
trinary choice set (30µml of 5%, 20% or 30% sucrose) followed by a second binary 
choice set (30µl of 20% or 30% sucrose; Figure 1). In the binary choice sets nine of the 
18 wells were randomly assigned to contain one option and the other nine contained 
the second option.  In the trinary choice sets a third (six) of the wells were randomly 
assigned to contain each option.  
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic for Trinary Matched and Binary Matched treatments. 
Differently patterned circles represent different colours of the reinforcement 
surrounding each well type. In the Trinary Matched treatment the colours of the first 
binary choice and the trinary choice are matched but in the second binary the wells are 
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marked with a new set of colours. In the Binary Matched treatment the colours of the 
trinary are not the same as the preceding binary. In the final binary choice the colours 
are the same as the trinary choice which preceded it.  
 
The treatments differed in the way that the colour which identified the contents 
of each well was assigned.  In one treatment (Trinary Matched), the colours indicating 
the 20% and 30% options in the trinary condition matched those of the preceding 
binary condition (Figure 1).  The colours changed for the second binary condition.  
The 5% option was a novel colour as this option was not present in the binary choice 
set. In the other treatment (Binary Matched), the colours indicating the 20% and 30% 
options in the trinary condition differed to those of the preceding binary condition but 
remained the same for the second binary condition.   
The birds were presented with each choice set until they had visited 80 wells. 
During each visit to the board (a bout) the bird was allowed to visit as many wells as 
he wished and we recorded the colours of the wells that the bird fed from. Once the 
bird left the board, the remaining sucrose in the wells was removed and the volume of 
sucrose remaining was measured using a 20µl capillary tube. The well was then 
refilled with the concentration appropriate for the colour of that well. After each visit 
the board was rotated 90º and after the 4
th
 visit to the board the board was replaced 
with another board with a new pattern of randomly assigned wells. If a bird failed to 
sample one well type after having visited the board four times then the bird received a 
board that contained only that well type. After he had visited the wells on this board he 
was presented with the board containing all the options and the count to a total of 80 
well visits began from zero.  
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Statistics 
In both treatments we compared the proportion of choices to the 30% option in each of 
the different choice conditions using a repeated measures ANOVA with Bonferroni 
corrections. In the analyses we looked at the proportion of choices to the 30% option 
from the total choices made to the 20% and 30% options in each choice set. To allow 
time for learning about the options available, instead of looking at all the choices we 
looked at the last 20 well visits made. The last 20 visits were used so that I could 
examine the choices which birds had made after experience with options to the choices 
made in the first 20 well visits when birds were still learning about the options. I also 
tested the preferences of males around the time when options were added or taken 
away from choice sets. Paired samples T tests were used to test for these changes in 
preference using the last 20 well visits before the addition or removal of an option in 
addition to the first 20 well visits of the new choice set; I only did this when colours 
were matched in the choice sets being compared. An independent samples T test was 
used to look at the difference in choices birds made in the first 20 well visits of the 
trinary choice sets in both treatments. All of the data were analysed with IBM SPSS 
version 19. 
 
Results 
In the Trinary Matched Treatment birds did not make different choices in the matched 
trinary than they did in the preceding binary (F (1, 5) = 0.178, p > 0.999). In addition, 
birds chose the 30% option the same amount in the final binary that they had in the 
trinary choice (F (1, 5) = 0.178, p > 0.999; Figure 2). Birds made fewer choices to the 
30% option in the first 20 choices of the trinary choice set than they did in the last 20 
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well visits of the first binary (t(5) = 3.221, p = 0.023; Figure 3). For cumulative 
choices to each option in the trinary matched treatment see appendix figure 1. 
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Figure 2. The proportion of choices that birds made to the 30% option in the 
Trinary Matched Treatment. Where the bars are grey, the colours used to mark each 
well are the same. In this treatment the colours of the 20% and 30% options in the 
trinary were matched to those of the preceding binary choice, the 5% options was a 
novel colour as it was not in the binary choice. The data are means ± 1 s.e. (N=6).  
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Figure 3. The proportion of choices birds made to the 30% option in the final 20 
well visits of the first binary choice sets and the first 20 well visits of the trinary 
choice. In the choice sets where the bars are the same shade, the colours used to mark 
each well in the experiments are the same, so in this Trinary Matched treatment the 
colours of the 20% and 30% options in trinary were matched to those of the preceding 
binary. The data are means ± 1 s.e. (N=12).  
 
 In the Binary Matched Treatment birds chose the 30% option the same amount 
in the first binary and the trinary choice set (F (1, 5) = 0.020, p > 0.999). Birds also did 
not make different choices in the trinary choice set than they did in the final binary 
matched choice set (F (1, 5) = 0.020, p > 0.999). There was also no difference in the 
proportion of choices that birds made to the 30% option in the binary choice set 
compared to the binary matched choice set (F (1, 5) = 0.020, p > 0.999; Figure 4). The 
removal of the 5% option in the second binary choice did not change the choices birds 
made to the 30% option (t(5) = 0.601, p = 0.574). Birds did not make different choices 
to the 30% option in the first 20 choices of the trinary choice set than they did in the 
last 20 well visits of the first binary (t(5) = 1.899, p = 0.116; Figure 5). For cumulative 
choices to each option in the binary matched treatment see appendix figure 2.  
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Figure 4. The proportion of choices that birds made to the 30% option in the 
Binary Matched Treatment. Where the bars are grey, the colours used to mark each 
well are the same. In this treatment the colours of the 20% and 30% options in the 
binary were matched to those of the preceding trinary choice. The data are means ± 1 
s.e. (N=6).  
 
 The proportion of choices that birds made to the 30% option in the first 20 
choices of the trinary treatment were not different in the Binary Matched and Trinary 
Matched Treatment (t (10) = 0.089, p = 0.931; Figure 4).  Birds in the Trinary Matched 
Treatment made fewer choices to the 30% option in the first 20 choices of the second 
binary choice set than birds in the Binary Matched Treatment (t (10) = -3.616, p = 
0.005; figure 5). 
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Figure 5. The proportion of choices birds made to the 30% option in the final 20 
well visits of the trinary choice set and the first 20 well visits of the final binary choice 
set. Where the bars are the same shade, the colours used to mark each well in the 
experiments are the same, so in this Binary Matched treatment the colours of the 20% 
and 30% options in binary were matched to those of the preceding trinary. The data are 
means ± 1 s.e. (N=12). 
 
Discussion  
In this experiment the choices birds made in the last 20 well visits in both of the binary 
and the trinary choice sets were not different in the two treatments. In addition within a 
treatment birds did not make different choices to the options in the last 20 well visits of 
any of the choice sets. In both treatments birds did not make different choices in binary 
and trinary choice sets. I also compared the first 20 choices made in a choice set to the 
final choices of the choice set which preceded it. In both treatments birds made fewer 
choices to the 30% option in the first 20 wells visits of the trinary than they did in the 
final 20 well visits of the binary choice, whether the colours of the 20% and 30% 
options in the trinary choice matched the binary made no difference to the preference 
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(Figure 3). However, the choices in the first 20 well visits of the final binary were 
affected by whether the colours matched the preceding trinary. When the colours were 
unmatched birds made fewer choices to the 30% option in the first 20 well visits of the 
binary than they did in the final 20 well visits of the trinary. But when the colours 
indicating the 20% and 30% options were the same in the trinary and binary choice 
sets birds made the same number of choices in the first 20 well visits of the binary than 
they did in the final 20 well visits of the trinary.   
 When I looked at the choices the birds made in the last 20 well visits for each 
context, we could find no evidence for an effect of prior experience on their decisions. 
In addition, when the 5% option was added in the trinary choice set there was no 
difference in the choices made to the 30% option between birds that had experienced 
the 20% and 30% options in the same colours and birds that had not experienced the 
same colours. In the final binary choice, however, experience of the options did appear 
to change the choices made by birds in the first 20 well visits. In the first 20 well visits 
of the final binary choice birds that experienced options with their colours matched to 
the previous trinary making made more choices to the 30% option than birds which 
had to relearn the colours (Figure 5).  
 There are several possible explanations for the lack of evidence for experience 
having an impact on the choices made by birds by the end of each context. Firstly, 
hummingbirds could update their information about the options available throughout 
the experiment so that by the end of each set of 80 choices, prior experience is no 
longer affecting their choices. Alternatively, hummingbirds might not use prior 
experience at all when making choices about those same options. However, this second 
possibility seems unlikely as, in this experiment the choice of the 30% option in the 
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final binary context was altered by prior experience: birds with experience chose the 
30% option more than did birds without this experience. This suggests that prior 
experience is having some effect as the birds with prior experience of an option in a 
trinary choice are using that information at the start of the following binary choice. 
However, birds only use prior information when options are removed from choice sets, 
not when the number of options is increased. It is possible that when a new item is 
added to the choice set the birds noticed that the range of options available for them to 
choose from had changed and as a result the birds responded to this by sampling all of 
the options again to update their knowledge of the options.  When an option is 
removed, however, they need not update their knowledge in the same way, especially 
if the option removed is poorer than those that remain. 
 In this experiment we only looked at one kind of prior experience, which was 
the knowledge the birds had of the experimental options and their colour associations. 
In addition to experience of options and their colour associations, there other types of 
prior experience that might change the choices made by hummingbirds. For example, 
animals that experienced a good option prior to a choice set of two reasonably good 
options might make different choices than individuals which experienced a poor option 
prior to the choice. Ants (Temnothorax curvispinosus) have different preferences due 
to prior experience of good or poor options, those experienced a poor nest before a 
choice of a new nest move to their new nest slower than ants that had experienced a 
good nest prior to the choice (Healey and Pratt, 2008). Another type of prior 
experience which can change the decisions made by animals is the effort previously 
required to acquire a particular option. For example, Gray jays (Perisoreus 
Canadensis) were presented with a task in which they could obtain a reward (raisins) 
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for different  costs (walking different lengths down a tube); these jays made different 
choices depending on their prior experience. Jays that had previously experienced a 
highly rewarded option (in this case three raisins) with little cost (a short way into the 
tube) were less likely to choose this same option when the cost of obtaining these three 
raisons was larger than birds with no experience of the option at little cost (Waite, 
2001b). Waite (2001a) suggested that experience of the option at the reduced cost had 
devalued the option, so birds with experience of the option at a lower cost than 
selected this option less frequently than birds with no experience. Previous 
experiments with hummingbirds looking at prior experience have found that they are 
more risk prone when they had foraged on high concentrations of sucrose than when 
they had experienced low concentrations of sucrose (Bacon et al., 2010). As 
differences in the energetic state of hummingbirds changes their future foraging 
choices (Bacon et al., 2010) in this experiment we kept the energetic state the same in 
the two treatment groups. Prior experience did not have a lasting impact on the choices 
made by the birds. To determine the full role of prior experience in the choice of 
hummingbirds further experiments would need to be conducted that changed prior 
experience in other ways, such as altering the cost of acquiring an option. However, 
these experiments would need to control the energy state of the animals as we know 
that changes in energy state can change the preferences of the birds.  
In this experiment learning the association between an option and its colour in 
a previous context did not have a lasting impact on the choices birds made to that 
option in subsequent choice sets. Although the choices made by hummingbirds in this 
experiment were not changed by knowledge of previous options their choices might be 
changed by other types of prior experience. We suggest that future work with 
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hummingbirds might be best focused on looking at other types of previous experience 
in hummingbirds. This will enable examination of whether hummingbirds use any 
prior experience (beyond their energy status) to guide their future foraging choices or 
if the choices of hummingbirds are influenced by local context only.   
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5                                                                                                                        79 
Chapter 5: Simultaneous or sequential presentation changes the choices made by 
hummingbirds 
Introduction 
In order to maximise their fitness animals are predicted to evaluate the fitness benefit 
of the options in decisions and choose the option with the greatest fitness benefit 
(Charnov, 1976, Pyke et al., 1977). However, there is accumulating evidence that 
animals, like humans, are making relative decisions (Bateson, 2002, Bateson et al., 
2003, Hurly and Oseen, 1999, Latty and Beekman, 2011, Morgan et al., 2012, Sasaki 
and Pratt, 2011, Scarpi, 2011, Waite, 2001a). The discovery that humans make relative 
decisions led to the formulations of new theories of decision making and the 
mechanisms that might underpin those decisions. Before we can do this for animal 
decision-making we need first to characterise the circumstances in which animals 
make relative decisions.  One plausible way to do this is to use the human data as a 
model to make predictions regarding those circumstances. 
 It is clear from the human literature that a key component of relative decision 
making is the manner in which the options are presented. Options that are presented 
sequentially are judged to be more similar than options that are presented 
simultaneously (Dato-on and Dahlstrom, 2003, Geiselman et al., 1984, Jordan and 
Uhlarik, 1985): for the reverse result see Wedell et al., 1987). This might also be true 
for animals, as both in experimental situations and in the real world animals encounter 
both simultaneous and sequential choices. For example, grouse females will encounter 
a number of males effectively simultaneously (Gibson, 1996) whereas bowerbird 
females visit the bowers of several males before choosing (Borgia, 1995).  
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 In this experiment then, we examined what effect presenting options 
sequentially or simultaneously caused on the choices made by foraging hummingbirds. 
In foraging hummingbirds relative decision-making is demonstrable by comparing the 
choices birds make between two favourable options with the choices birds make 
among those same options with an inferior option added to the choice set. To examine 
the effect of manner of presentation on decision making, then, I presented birds with 
one of two treatments. In one treatment birds were presented with three options (30µl 
of 5%, 20% and 30% sucrose solution) simultaneously. In the other treatment birds 
were presented with each of these options sequentially. Although we expect a 
difference between the treatments, it is not clear from the human literature the 
direction in which the manner of presentation should affect the hummingbirds’ 
choices.  
 
Materials and Methods  
Subjects and study site 
The subjects were 14 wild male rufous hummingbirds defending territories in the 
Westcastle Valley in the eastern range of the Rocky Mountains (49° 21’N, 114° 
25’W), Alberta, Canada. In mid-May commercial hummingbird feeders containing 
14% sucrose were placed in potential territories and by late May most of the feeders 
were defended by males. Territorial males were caught using a drop-door trap 
surrounding the feeder and individually marked by a small application of non-toxic, 
waterproof ink to the breast feathers enabling birds to be identified without recapture. 
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The data were collected from 7:00 to 20:00 hours Mountain Standard Time during 
May-July, 2011. All work was approved by the University of St Andrews Ethical 
Committee, conducted according to the requirements of the Canadian Council on 
Animal Care and was carried out under permits from Environment Canada and the 
Alberta Sustainable Resource Development Fish and Wildlife division.  
 
Training 
The subjects were trained initially to feed from a Plexiglas board (28 cm x 21.5 cm x 
1.2 cm) containing 18 wells (10 mm deep, 3.5 mm in diameter) that could hold a 
maximum of 120µl and set on a stake 80cm tall. These wells were arranged in an 
offset pattern with each well 5.2cm from each of its nearest neighbours. All of the 
wells were marked with yellow paper reinforcements and all contained 50µl of 25% 
sucrose solution.  The board was at an angle of 45º and after each visit it was rotated a 
quarter turn clockwise and the stake and board moved a short distance (10-20cm).  
This was to ensure that the birds did not learn the spatial location of the well contents.  
Once the board had been rotated four times training was considered complete and the 
experiment proper began.  This training phase typically took approximately two hours.  
 
Experimental procedure 
Each bird experienced one of two experimental treatments: a Simultaneous Treatment 
(n = 7) or a Sequential Treatment (n = 7).  
Chapter 5                                                                                                                        82 
Simultaneous Treatment 
In the Simultaneous Treatment, we presented each bird with a board with the 18 wells 
divided into three types: six wells contained 30µl of 5%, six wells contained 30µl of 
20% and the remaining six wells contained 30µl of 30% sucrose solution. The wells 
were marked with coloured reinforcement rings to indicate the contents of the well to 
the bird. A bird was allowed to visit the board and feed from the wells to a total of 80 
well visits.  If there was any sucrose remaining in the wells after a visit to the board 
then the remaining sucrose was removed and the empty wells were refilled. After each 
visit the bird made to the board, the board was rotated through 90º.  After four visits 
the board was replaced with another board with a different set of randomly assigned 
wells. If a bird failed to sample every option within the first 10 visits to the board we 
forced him to sample the avoided option by presenting him with a board containing 
only the unsampled option.   
 
Sequential Treatment 
In the Sequential Treatment birds were presented with a series of boards such that he 
experienced each of the three options on a board alone.  Each bird was presented with 
an 18-well board with wells containing 30mµl of only one the three of the options (5%, 
20% and 30%).  Each option was presented until the bird had visited 20 wells.  He was 
then presented with a board with only one of the other options for 20 visits, followed 
by a board of the third option for a further 20 visits. The wells were marked with 
coloured reinforcement rings to indicate the contents of the well to the bird. The order 
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of the presentation was pseudo randomised across birds. Following the presentations of 
boards containing single options only, the birds were presented with a board with all 
three options available to choose among (six wells of each; Figure 1).  The birds were 
allowed 20 visits to this mixed board.  When all of the options were simultaneously 
available, a third of the wells were randomly assigned to contain each option. 
 
Figure 1.  
Schematic for Sequential and Simultaneous Treatments. Differently patterned circles 
represent different colours surrounding each well type. In the Sequential Treatment 
options were learned one at a time before being presented together at the end. In the 
Simultaneous treatment all options were present at the same time.   
 
On a visit to a board, the bird could feed from as many wells as he wished.  If 
there was any sucrose remaining in the wells then the volume of sucrose that was 
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remaining was removed and the empty wells were refilled.  When there was only one 
option presented, the board was rotated through 90º after each visit to bird made to the 
board.  When all three options were presented together on the board, the board was 
rotated through 90° after each visit and after the bird made four visits to the board it 
was replaced with another board with a different set of randomly assigned wells.  The 
stake with board was moved after each 4
th
 visit.  If a bird did not sample one of the 
options when all three were present, he was not forced to try the avoided option.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
All of the data were analysed using IBM SPSS version 19. Independent samples 
Mann-Whitney U-tests were used to compare the choices made by birds to each of the 
options across the two treatments.  
 
Results 
There was a trend for birds to choose the 30% option more often in the last 20 well 
visits of the Simultaneous Treatment than they did in the Sequential Treatment (U = 
39.00, z = 1.886, p = 0.059; Figure 2) but they chose the 5% and the 20% options 
equally often in the two treatments (5% : U = 17.50, z = -1.468, p = 0.142; 20%: U = 
11.00, z = -1.748, p = 0.080; Figure 2). Although there are insufficient data for 
analysis, in the sequential treatment order of presentation of the 5% or 30% options 
does not seem to change the number of choices made to those options (see appendix 
Figures 1 and 2). 
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Figure 2. 
Number of choices which birds made to the 5%, 20% and 30% options in the last 20 
well visits made in the Simultaneous and Sequential Treatments. The data are means ± 
s.e. (N = 14). 
 
However, birds in the Simultaneous Treatment have had more experience of 
the 30% option than had the birds in the Sequential Treatment. To examine whether 
experience might have caused the birds in the simultaneous treatment to choose the 
30% option more often we compared the preference for 30% after birds from both 
groups had experienced that option 20 times. Birds in the Simultaneous Treatment 
chose the 30% option after having 20 experiences more frequently than did birds in the 
Sequential Treatment having experienced the 30% option 20 times (U = 40.00, z = 
2.009, p = 0.044).  The first 20 visits to the 30 option by birds in the Simultaneous 
Treatment were interspersed with visits to the 5% and 20% options. Birds chose the 
5% option equally often in the Simultaneous Treatment after having twenty 
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experiences of the 30% option as birds in the final 20 well visits of the Sequential 
Treatment  (5% : U = 17.50, z = -1.468, p = 0.142). The 20% option was also chosen 
the same amount after 20 wells visits to the 30% options in the Simultaneous 
Treatment as for birds in the Sequential Treatment (20% : U = 12.50, z = -1.556, p = 
0.128; Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Number of choices which birds made to the 5%, 20% and 30% options in the 
last 20 well visits of the Sequential Treatments and the choices birds made to these 
options in the 20 choices after birds had experienced the 30% option 20 times. The 
data are means ± s.e. (N = 14). 
 
We then wanted to ask whether the birds in the Sequential Treatment had 
learned anything about the options from the preceding experience of the options 
presented alone. Birds chose the 30% option as often in the first 20 well visits of the 
Simultaneous Treatment as they did in the last 20 well visits of the Sequential 
Treatment (30%: U = 25.00, z = 0.065, p = 0.948).  They also chose the 20% options 
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equally often (20%: U = 16.00, z = -1.111, p = 0.276).  Birds chose the 5% option 
more often in the first 20 well visits of the Simultaneous Treatment than they did in the 
last 20 well visits of the Sequential Treatment (U = 45.00, z = 2.763, p = 0.006). 
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Figure 4. Number of choices which birds made to the 5%, 20% and 30% options. In 
the Simultaneous Treatment these were the first 29 choices and in the Sequential 
Treatment this was the final 20 well visits. The data are means ± s.e. (N = 14). 
 
Discussion  
Manner of presentation appears to have changed the preferences of hummingbirds for 
the most favourable option; birds preferred 30% option more when options had been 
presented simultaneously than when they were presented sequentially. A larger 
preference for the 30% option in the Simultaneous Treatment could be due to a 
difference in the ability of the birds to compare the options available. Comparing the 
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options with one another is likely to be easier for birds in the Simultaneous Treatment 
than for birds in the Sequential Treatment as the options are experienced alongside one 
another and therefore may explain the larger preference for the 30% option. However, 
the results are also consistent with prior experience having no discernible impact on 
the choices of the sequential birds. This could be because either they did not remember 
the options when presented alone or alternatively they did not use that information 
when confronted with the options presented simultaneously. To determine whether 
either of these possibilities could explain the result from Experiment1 we carried out 
Experiment 2.  
 
Experiment 2 
To determine whether the experience of an option presented alone prior to the 
presentation of a trinary choice set makes a significant contribution to the changes in 
preference seen between binary and trinary contexts I conducted Experiment 2.Ie 
presented birds with one of two treatments consisting or two choice sets each, birds 
completed both choice sets. In one treatment (No Experience Treatment) birds were 
presented with two options (either 30µl of 20% and 30% sucrose solution or 30µl of 
5% and 20% sucrose solution) followed by a choice of three options (30µl of 5%, 20% 
and 30% sucrose solution). In the other treatment (Experience Treatment) birds were 
also presented with a choice of the same two options as in the previous treatment (30µl 
of 20% and 30% or 5% and 20% sucrose solution) only in this treatment birds 
experienced the new option (either 30 µl of 5% or 30%) prior to the choice of three 
options.  
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If birds use prior information about options that are experienced alone to guide 
their choices when those options are presented together I would expect that birds with 
prior experience of options would make more choices to preferred options and fewer 
choices to non-preferred options than birds with no experience. Therefore I expect that 
if birds use information learned when options are presented alone birds in the 
Experience Treatment will make more choices to the 30% option when it has been 
presented alone prior to the trinary choice set than birds in the No Experience 
Treatment that have not experienced the 30% option alone. I also predict that birds in 
the Experience Treatment that experience the 5% option prior to the trinary choice set 
will make fewer choices of this option than birds in the No Experience option that do 
not have prior experience of the 5% option.  
 
Materials and Methods 
Subjects and study site 
The subjects were 11 wild male rufous hummingbirds defending territories in 
the Westcastle Valley. Eight birds had participated in Experiment 1 and received no 
further training. The three birds that had not taken part in Experiment 1 were trained in 
the manner described in Experiment 1. The data were collected from 7:00 to 20:00 
hours Mountain Standard Time in June- July in 2011. All work was approved by the 
University of St Andrews Ethical Committee, conducted according to the requirements 
of the Canadian Council on Animal Care and was carried out under permits from 
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Environment Canada and the Alberta Sustainable Resource Development Fish and 
Wildlife division.  
 
Experimental procedure 
The experimental apparatus was as described for Experiment 1.  Each bird experienced 
one of two experimental treatments: the Experience Treatment (n = 5) and the No-
Experience Treatment (n = 6).   
 
Experience treatment 
In the Experience Treatment there were two components and birds completed both. In 
the 5% component birds were presented with a binary choice of 30µl of either 20% or 
30% sucrose solution. Birds then had an experience of the 5% option where they had a 
board containing only the 5% option which they visited for one bout. After the 
experience of the 5% option birds were presented with a trinary choice of 30µl of 5%, 
20% and 30% sucrose solution. In the 30% component birds were presented with a 
binary choice of 30µl 5% and 20%. Birds then experienced the 30% option alone for 
one bout before completing a trinary choice of 30µl of 5%, 20% and 30% sucrose 
solution (Figure 5).   
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No Experience treatment 
In the No Experience Treatment there were also two components and birds completed 
both. In the No Experience treatment birds also had a binary and a trinary choice set 
but birds did not experience the new option alone before the trinary choice. In the 5% 
component birds were presented with a binary choice of 30µl of either 20% or 30% 
sucrose solution. After this binary choice birds were presented with a trinary choice of 
30µl of 5%, 20% and 30% sucrose solution. In the 30% component birds were 
presented with a binary choice of 30µl of 5% and 20%, followed by a trinary choice of 
30µl of 5%, 20% and 30% sucrose solution (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. Schematic for Experience and No Experience Treatments. Differently 
patterned circles represent the different colours surrounding each well type. In both the 
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Experience and the No Experience Treatments birds had a binary choice followed by a 
trinary choice. However, birds in the Experience Treatment experienced the new 
option alone before the trinary choice and birds in the No Experience Treatment did 
not experience the new option prior to the trinary choice. In both treatments birds 
experienced both a binary choice of 20% and 30% followed by a trinary of all three 
options as well as a binary choice of 5% and 20% followed by another trinary choice 
set.  
 
In both treatments for the binary and trinary choice sets birds made in a total of 20 well 
visits to the options they wished. The order of presentation of the 5% and 30% 
components were counter-balanced across birds with birds completing both 5% and 
30% components. In binary choice sets half of the wells were randomly assigned to 
contain each option and in trinary choice sets a third of wells were assigned to contain 
each of the options. When birds in the Experienced Treatment had an experience of 
either the 5% or the 30% option all wells were filled with the option. Each option was 
indicated to the birds by a colour reinforcement placed around the well. After each 
visit to the board the remaining sucrose was removed, the wells refilled and the board 
was rotated. The contents of each well were indicated to the bird by a coloured paper 
reinforcement placed around the well.   
  
Statistical Analyses 
All of the data were analysed using IBM SPSS version 19. I looked at the difference in 
the number of choices birds made to the 30% option in the 30% component between 
the Experience treatment (where birds had experienced the 30% option alone) and the 
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No Experience treatment (birds had no experience of the 30% option). I also looked at 
the number of choices made to the 5% option in the 5% component of the Experienced 
and No Experience Treatment. The differences in the number of choices birds made to 
the 5% and 30% options were calculated using an Independent Samples Mann 
Whitney U test.  
 
Results 
In the 5% component there was no difference in the number of choices birds made to 
the 5% option in the trinary choice set by birds in the Experienced Treatment (where 
birds had experience of the 30% option prior to the trinary choice) and No Experience 
Treatment (where birds had no experience of the 30% option) (U = 21.50, z = 1.212, p 
= 0.226; Figure 6a).  
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Figure 6(a). Number of choices made by birds to 5%, 20% and 30% options when 
birds either had prior experience of the 5% option (Experience) or no experience with 
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the 5% option (No Experience). The data are mean number of choices to each option ± 
s.e. (N=11). 
 
In the trinary choice set of the 30% component, birds in the Experience Treatment did 
not choose the 30% option differently than birds in the No Experience Treatment (U = 
6.50, z = -1.555, p = 0.120; 6b).   
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Figure 6(b). Number of choices made by birds to 5%, 20% and 30% options when 
birds either had prior experience of the 30% option (Experienced) or no experience 
with the 30% option (No Experience). The data are mean number of choices to each 
option ± s.e. (N=11). 
 
Discussion 
It appears that prior experience of an option presented alone had no major effect on the 
decisions made by hummingbirds. Birds with experience of the non-preferred 5% 
option did not make fewer choices to this option than birds in the No Experience 
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Treatment. Similarly, birds in the Experience Treatment did not make more choices to 
the preferred 30% option after they had experienced this option alone than birds in the 
No Experience Treatment that had not had experience of this option alone.  
 It seems that when an option is presented alone birds do not remember or use 
this information to inform their future choices when the options are later presented 
simultaneously. However, although not significant, when birds had experience of the 
options they made fewer choices to the 5% option and more choices to the 30% option 
than birds in the No Experience Treatment. It could be that there is an effect but we did 
not see it for one of three reasons: (1) the sample size was too small; (2) prior 
experimental experience for many of the birds tested in Experiment 2 increased the 
variation in response; (3) the effect with regard to 5% is difficult to show because the 
birds learn this option very quickly.  
 
General Discussion 
In Experiment 1 hummingbirds made more choices to the sweeter option (30% 
sucrose) when the options were presented simultaneously than when birds experienced 
options sequentially. In the Sequential Treatment the order in which the boards of 
single options only were presented did not affect the choices made to the 30% option 
in the trinary choice. Birds that had learned about options sequentially made fewer 
choices to the poor 5% option than naïve birds. However, there was no difference in 
the choices made to the 30% option by naïve birds and the choices made by birds that 
had experienced the options sequentially. In Experiment 2, hummingbirds with 
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experience of either a poor option or a preferred option presented alone prior to a 
choice set did not make different choices than birds with no experience. 
Presenting the three options together as in the Simultaneous Treatments 
appears to have led to an exacerbated preference for 30% and an enhanced avoidance 
of 5%. This effect can already be seen by the first 20 experiences of the 30% option in 
the Simultaneous Treatment. In effect these birds have learned very rapidly which 
options are  best and which are poorest. For the simultaneous birds in spite of having 
experienced the best and the poorest options it appears that this does not aid them in 
determining which is the best option when all three are presented together although it 
might aid them in avoiding the poorest option.  
 The avoidance of 5% in the trinary of the sequential treatment suggests that 
birds have not forgotten about the options, which they learned alone. The data from 
Experiment 2 however suggest that it is not easy to demonstrate that animals have not 
forgotten information learned previously. There is a methodological corollary to this 
point in that in the past birds that did not visit one of the options early in the 
experiment were forced to experience the option presented alone. As it is now not clear 
what impact this would have on the birds’ future choices perhaps this practice should 
be discontinued. Those birds that do not visit the choice presented early in the 
experiment should be excluded from the experiment.    
As with human experiments the mode of presentation makes a difference. 
However, there is no clear pattern in the human data to the way in which mode of 
presentation impacts on context dependent choice. Our data would suggest that 
experiments in which options are presented simultaneously may be more likely to 
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result in more striking differences in the preferences for the available options. This 
could mean for example that peahens experiencing multiple males simultaneously have 
stronger preferences for some males than do bower bird females experiencing males 
sequentially. Alternatively this could mean that testing mate preferences should be 
done using the mode of presenting mate options that is consistent with the mode in 
which those animals experience those options in the wild. Given that most non-lekking 
species will encounter possible mates sequentially, examining mate preferences in 
those species in the lab simultaneously might lead to exaggerated preferences. The 
data presented here might suggest that experiments which present options 
simultaneously may over emphasise the value of one trait over another. This 
possibility requires experimental testing. It seems unlikely that this would best be done 
with peahens or bowers birds.  
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Chapter 6: Context effects the assessment of health in human faces 
 
Introduction 
When making decisions, we expect that individuals should consistently choose 
options that confer the largest benefit (Edwards, 1961, Simon, 1959, Schoemaker, 
1982, Rieskamp et al., 2006).  Since the benefits conveyed to the individual when 
choosing a particular option are independent of the benefits of choosing an alternative 
option, an individual’s selection of that option should also be independent of the 
presence of inferior options ((Rieskamp et al., 2006). However, contrary to this 
prediction the choices made by both humans and animals do appear to be influenced 
by the presence of inferior options (Bateson, 2002, Bateson et al., 2003b, Edwards and 
Pratt, 2009, Hurly and Oseen, 1999, Shafir et al., 2002, Tversky and Simonson, 1993, 
Wedell, 1991, Huber et al., 1982). In humans, when inferior options are added to 
choice sets containing options that vary in multiple attributes, people increase the 
proportion of choices they make for the option that is similar to the inferior option but 
better than it in at least one dimension (Doyle et al., 1999, Bateman et al., 2008). Even 
when the options vary only in a single dimension the choices made by both humans 
and animals can be changed by the addition of poorer options (Hurly and Oseen, 1999, 
Morgan et al., 2012, Wedell et al.,  1987).  
In humans, there is a considerable literature on the facial features used to 
choose among possible partners, or at least, that are considered most attractive.  How 
attractive possible partners are can also be changed by the context in which those 
options occur. For example, after seeing an attractive female, males are more likely to 
rate subsequent average females as less attractive (Kenrick and Gutierres, 1980). 
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However, it is not clear what decision-making mechanisms underpin the evaluation of 
the faces as the focus is usually on which of the facial features are used (Geiselman et 
al., 1984, Kenrick and Gutierres, 1980, Melamed and Moss, 1975, Wanke et al., 2001).  
Here we set out to test one suggested mechanism for the context-dependent 
effects, which is the compromise effect.  The compromise effect is an increase in 
preference for an option that lies between two extreme options, which has been widely 
reported when consumers choose among products (Dhar et al., 2000, Simonson, 1989, 
Simonson and Tversky, 1992). To determine whether the addition of a poor option to a 
choice set of two options can cause changes in the preferred choice via the 
compromise effect, we exploited the finding that the degree of yellow in the skin 
influences how healthy and attractive the face appears: a moderate increase in the 
yellowness of faces is seen as more attractive than are either very yellow faces or faces 
with much less yellow (Stephen et al., 2011, Stephen et al., 2009, Whitehead et al., 
2012).  Participants were presented with pairs or trios of faces that varied in the degree 
of yellow in the faces.  The pairs of faces both had relatively healthy levels of facial 
yellow but the trios consisted of two relatively healthy faces accompanied by a third 
face that was coloured yellow to a degree considered much less healthy (Stephen et al., 
2009). If participants’ perception of a face’s health is context dependent, the addition 
of either of the inferior options (Yellow 2- or Yellow 2+) should alter the perceived 
health of the moderately yellow faces (Yellow – and Yellow +).  If the compromise 
effect underpins this alteration in preference, participants should prefer the option that 
is the intermediate of the three options. This would mean that the addition of a very 
yellow option (Yellow 2+) should increase participants’ preference for the slightly 
Chapter 6                                                                                                                      100 
 
more yellow faces (Yellow +) while the inclusion of the much less yellow option 
(Yellow 2-) should increase the preference for the slightly less yellow option  
(Yellow-).  
 
Methods 
Participants 
31 undergraduate students at the University of St Andrews volunteered to take 
part in an experiment investigating the effect of skin-colour changes on the perception 
of health. 24 of the participants identified themselves as Caucasian and 7 did not give 
their ethnicity. 17 participants identified themselves as male, 12 identified as female 
and 2 participants did not give their gender. The experiment took place in a small 
white room containing only a computer between 9am-5pm. Participants were alone 
when they completed the experiment, which took roughly an hour. Participants were 
made aware that they could withdraw from the experiment at any time without 
explanation. Ethical approval was obtained from the University of St Andrews 
Teaching and Research Ethics Committee, and prior to the experiment we obtained 
informed written consent from all participants.  Participants first completed a 
questionnaire identifying their sex, country of residence, ethnic origin and sexual 
preference (for questionnaire see appendix).  
 
Image creation  
The faces we used in the experiment were of 29 Caucasian females without makeup 
and with neutral expressions. The photographs were taken using a Fujifilm FinePix 
S5Pro digital SLR camera (60mm fixed length lens) in a booth painted with 
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achromatic matt grey paint. For these images illumination was from three 6504K bulbs 
(VeriVide, Ltd). The camera was white-balanced according to a GregtagMacbeth 
white balance card in these lighting conditions. Participants held a grey painted board 
over their shoulders to prevent reflections from clothing. A GregtagMacbeth Mini 
ColorChecker was included in each image to color-calibrate images. Images were 
color-corrected by transforming observed values of each of the 24 color-checker 
patches towards known values of these same patches using a least-squares transform 
from an 11-expression polynomial expansion (Stephen et al., 2009, Stephen et al., 
2011, Whitehead et al., 2012). Matlab was used to calculate mean colour values across 
skin pixels for each face image and these colour values defined the starting colour for 
each face. The colour of the faces was then adjusted by using Matlab to produce masks 
of colour, these masks were used to increase or decrease the yellowness of the faces. 
The masks applied were Gaussian blurred at the edges of the face (SD ± 3 pixels), to 
prevent final images having an obvious color border. The mask changed the colour of 
the face including lips and ears but the eyes, hair and background were unchanged. 
Four versions of each face were created which varied in the Yellowness only. The least 
yellow shade was the Yellow2- shade; and the yellowness of this shade was reduced 
by 2.666 units. The Yellow- shade had the yellowness increased by 2.666 and in the 
Yellow+ shade the yellowness was increased by 7.999 units of yellowness. For Shade 
Yellow2- the yellowness of each face was increased by 13.333 units (Figure 1). 
Images were presented to the participants on a 19 inch Iiyama Vision Master 1451 
monitor. Each image was 6cm by 8cm and presented on a black background.  The 
images were numbered from left to right so that participants could identify each image.  
The positions of the images on the screen were randomized.   
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  Figure 1. 
         
         Yellow2-                Yellow -                  Yellow+                Yellow2+ 
Figure 1. An example face set showing one face in all of the four shades of yellow: 
Yellow2-, Yellow-, Yellow+, Yellow2+.  
 
Experimental Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a windowless testing room (≈ 2m x 3m) with an 
office desk, a chair and the computer used to run the experiment. Participants were 
tested singly. On arrival each participant completed a consent form and the 
experimental procedure was described to them. Once a participant had agreed that they 
understood the procedure the experimenter left the room. The computer screen showed 
the questionnaire concerning the participant’s details. Once the participant had 
completed the on screen questionnaire, the following screen informed them which of 
two treatments was about to follow (Sequential or Simultaneous).  The participants 
were presented with pairs or trios of faces and asked to choose the face they 
considered to be healthiest from each set.  In each pair (binary) or trio (trinary set) the 
images were of the same face, each differing only in the yellowness of the face.  
Binary choice sets consisted of a choice between the faces that were Yellow - and 
Yellow +, both of which are considered to be relatively healthy. Trinary choice sets 
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consisted of a Yellow – face, a Yellow + face and either a Yellow 2+ face or a Yellow 
2- face. After each choice set participants were asked to identify the healthiest face and 
its relative health on a ten-point scale ranging from very healthy to very unhealthy. 
The ten point scale was presented as a horizontal line with unnumbered checks across 
the middle of the screen. The left hand end of the line was labeled “very unhealthy” 
and the right hand end was labeled “very healthy”. Using the mouse the participants 
clicked at the point along the line they considered to represent the “health” of the 
healthiest face. Then they confirmed the end of the trial by clicking ok and the next set 
of faces was presented.         
As the order of presentation can influence choices, for half of the trials the 
faces were presented simultaneously, and in half the trials, the faces were presented 
sequentially (Damisch et al., 2006, Dato-on and Dahlstrom, 2003, Geiselman et al., 
1984, Jordan and Uhlarik, 1985, Wanke et al., 2001, Wedell et al., 1987).  In the 
Sequential Condition the faces were presented one after another before participants 
were asked to choose a face whereas in the Simultaneous Condition all of the faces 
were presented on the screen at the same time. For both the Simultaneous and 
Sequential Conditions there were three choice sets for each face (one binary and two 
trinary, comprising of all of the four versions of the face). The order of the choice sets 
was pseudo-randomized so that choice sets using the same face did not occur adjacent 
to one another.  
In both the Sequential and the Simultaneous Conditions the images were 
presented for a total of five seconds of exposure per image. This meant that in the 
binary choice set in the Simultaneous condition the two images were presented 
simultaneously for ten seconds and in trinary choice condition the three images were 
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presented simultaneously for fifteen seconds.  In the Sequential Condition, the first 
image was presented for five seconds, followed by blank screen for two seconds before 
the presentation of the second image (followed by a further two seconds of blank 
screen and then the third image for the trinary condition). In the Sequential Condition 
the images were presented on the same position on screen as they were presented in 
the Simultaneous Condition and the faces were numbered left to right to allow 
participants to identify the face which looked healthiest. 
Each participant completed 90 trials in each of the Sequential and the 
Simultaneous Conditions and the order of conditions was pseudo randomized across 
the participants. After 180 trials, which took 50-60 minutes, the screen instructed the 
participants to inform the experimenter that they had finished the experiment.  
 
Analysis  
I analysed participants’ decisions about the face they thought looked the healthiest by 
examining the choices to Yellow+ faces divided by the sum of choices to Yellow+ and 
Yellow-. As the proportional data were not normally distributed, they were 
transformed prior to analysis using an arcsine square root transformation.  I compared 
preference across the conditions using repeated-measures ANOVAs and if the data 
violated the assumption of sphericity then they were corrected using a Greenhouse-
Geisser correction. 
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Results 
In the binary choice when options were presented simultaneously participants 
preferred the Yellow + option (t(30) = 2.035, p = 0.051). When faces of Yellow + and 
Yellow – were presented simultaneously with faces of Yellow 2+, participants chose 
the Yellow + as the healthiest face more frequently than when Yellow + faces were 
presented only with Yellow – faces set (F(1.451, 43.535) = 49.343, p < 0.001; Figure 
2a).  When faces of Yellow + and Yellow – were presented simultaneously with faces 
of Yellow 2-, however, participants chose the Yellow - as the healthiest more 
frequently than when Yellow + faces were presented only with Yellow – faces 
(F(1.451, 43.535) = 49.343, p < 0.001). For changes in preference shown by individual 
participants when options were presented simultaneously see Appendix Table 1. 
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Figure 2a. The proportion of choices participants made in the Simultaneous Condition 
to the Yellow Plus shade when options were presented simultaneously in binary and 
trinary choice sets. Binary indicates participants had a choice between Yellow and 
Yellow plus shades. The Trinary Minus choice was between shade Yellow Minus, 
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Yellow and Yellow Plus. The Trinary Plus comprised a choice between Yellow, 
Yellow Plus and Yellow Two Plus. The asterisk indicates significance at p ≤ 0.05. The 
data are means ± s.e. (N = 31).   
 
When images were presented sequentially, in the binary choice participants 
also preferred the Yellow + face (t(30) = 4.336, p < 0.001). We saw the same pattern 
of results in the Sequential Treatment: the addition of Yellow 2+ to the choice set of 
Yellow – and Yellow + led to an increased choice of Yellow + faces as the healthiest 
while the addition of Yellow 2- led to an increased choice of Yellow – faces as the 
healthiest (addition of Yellow 2+: (F(1.539, 46.181) = 44.054, p < 0.001); addition of 
Yellow 2-: F(1.539, 46.181) = 44.054, p < 0.001; Figure 2b). For changes in 
preference shown by individual participants when options were presented sequentially 
see Appendix Table 2. 
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Figure 2b. The proportion of choices participants made in the Sequential Condition to 
the Yellow Plus shade when options were presented simultaneously in binary and 
trinary choice sets. Binary indicates participants had a choice between Yellow and 
Yellow plus shades. The Trinary Minus choice was between shade Yellow Minus, 
Yellow and Yellow Plus. The Trinary Plus comprised a choice between Yellow, 
Yellow Plus and Yellow Two Plus. The asterisk indicates significance at p ≤ 0.05. The 
data are means ± s.e. (N = 31).   
 
When the images were presented sequentially, participants choose the Yellow+ 
faces as the healthiest more frequently than they did when the options were presented 
simultaneously (t(30) -2.035, p = 0.051). There was a similar effect when Yellow 2- 
was added to the choice set of Yellow + and Yellow – conditions: participants in the 
Sequential Treatment decided that the Yellow - faces were more healthy than when 
images were presented simultaneously (t(30) -2.269, p = 0.031). However, the addition 
of Yellow 2+ to the choice set of Yellow + and Yellow – in the Sequential Condition 
did not differ from its impact in the Simultaneous Condition (t(30) = -0.352, p = 
0.727).  
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The gender of the participants did not affect the proportion of choices made to 
the Yellow+ in any of the contexts (F(1, 27) = 0.005, p = 0.946).  See Appendix for 
choices made by individuals in each choice set.  
 
Discussion  
When participants were asked to rate health among trios of faces that varied in 
their yellowness, they tended to choose the face with the intermediate degree of 
yellow. The addition of a much yellower face to a choice set of two relatively healthy 
faces increased the choice of the yellower of the two healthy faces while the addition 
of a much less yellow face decreased the choice of the yellower of the two healthy 
faces. When faces were presented sequentially participants chose the Yellow + faces as 
the healthiest more frequently than did participants when presented with faces 
simultaneously. However, the pattern of changes in preference upon the addition of the 
decoys did not differ depending on the mode of presentation.   
The change in participants’ choice of healthy faces is the outcome that would 
be expected from the compromise effect. When three options are available the choice 
is expected to be directed to the middle option. To determine whether the “middle” is 
the average or any option between the two extremes requires testing with multiple 
intermediate options. However, tests using multiple intermediate options are not 
straight forward because there is debate as to whether the discriminability of options 
might change based on the position or density of the options added (Krumhansl, 1978, 
Parducci, 1965). An alternative explanation for the results is that exposure to faces 
biases the perception of novel faces. Faces similar to the faces previously presented are 
viewed as more typical than they would otherwise be rated (Little et al., 2011). 
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However, experiments which show adaptation to extreme facial features frequently 
only present in the extreme faces prior to the choice (Leopold et al., 2001, Leopold et 
al., 2005, Rhodes et al., 2001, Webster et al., 2004, Webster and MacLin, 1999) rather 
than at the time as is the case with this experiment. Therefore it seems unlikely that 
this would explain the results. It is also plausible that participants were not assessing 
the health of the faces, but would have chosen the middle option even if we had asked 
another question. There would be two ways to exclude this possibility, either 
participants could be given the same set of faces and asked to rate some other feature 
unrelated to health or participants could be presented with faces which are much less 
yellow and so seen as unhealthy. In these cases we would expect that participants 
would all choose the yellowest faces every time which would demonstrate that 
participants were assessing the health of the faces rather than simply choosing the 
intermediate option.   
   Although the compromise effect is commonly seen in consumer research (Dhar 
et al., 2000, Simonson, 1989, Simonson and Tversky, 1992), this is, to my knowledge 
the first demonstration that the compromise effect may also impact on decisions 
regarding perception of human health. The data show that the face that is considered 
the healthiest depends on the range of faces presented: extending the range of options 
towards more yellow in the face led to participants choosing the slightly more yellow 
face as the healthiest. However, those same participants deemed the slightly less 
yellow face to be the healthiest when the range of faces to choose among was extended 
to include much less yellow faces. Participants were not then able to decide which the 
healthiest face was. This may mean that the quest for determining the healthiest or 
most attractive face is unlikely to lead to a single value.  
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It seems plausible that other context dependent effects might impact on 
decisions as to which is the healthiest or most attractive option. For example in this 
experiment presenting faces sequentially rather than simultaneously apparently led to 
more participants considering the slightly yellower face to be healthier than the slightly 
less yellow face. Although this might suggest that prior experience might play some 
role in decision making the time scale over which that experience might have an 
impact is not clear.  
More generally these data suggest that the interpretation of data from 
experiments in which animals are required to choose between two options only may 
also not represent absolute preferences.  
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Chapter 7: Context does not change the assessment of health in human faces 
 
Introduction 
The judgements that people make about the health and attractiveness of others 
are not independent of the context in which the options are placed. Rather, those 
judgements (often based on images of faces) are influenced by the presence of other 
options, including inferior options (Kenrick and Gutierres, 1980, Kenrick et al., 1989, 
Melamed and Moss, 1975). The most frequent of these effects is that faces or bodies of 
average attractiveness are judged as more attractive when presented alongside images 
of less attractive people and are judged as less attractive when presented together with 
images of very attractive people (Kenrick and Gutierres, 1980, Kenrick et al., 1989, 
Melamed and Moss, 1975). The effect of context on attractiveness assessments can 
even be demonstrated when the figures or faces are represented schematically e.g. as 
line drawings (Wedell and Pettibone, 1999, Wedell et al., 2005).  
Determining the mechanism(s) that underpins these context effects is 
somewhat difficult as to date, the range of faces from which choice sets are drawn are 
usually sets of manipulated faces, in which only one feature of interest is manipulated.  
However, when most attributes of a face are manipulated, that manipulation usually 
impacts on the assessment of other features. For example, changing the distance 
separating the eyes will lead to changes in the relative distance of the eyes to all other 
points on the face (Wedell and Pettibone 1999).  In this experiment, therefore, we 
attempted to examine whether context-dependent effects occur in assessments of 
health when only a single feature is manipulated, by using faces in which variation 
occurred only in the colour of the face. We manipulated the degree of yellow in the 
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faces because even a moderate increase in yellowness increases the perceived health of 
a face (Stephen et al., 2011, Stephen et al., 2009, Whitehead et al., 2012). This may be 
because yellowness of the skin increases with dietary consumption of carotenoids 
(Whitehead et al., 2012), which are antioxidants that may offer protection from free 
radicals (Alaluf et al., 2002, Sies, 1997).  Facial yellowness also decreases with at least 
some illnesses (Darvin et al., 2008).  
In Chapter 3, hummingbirds’ choices of two favourable options were 
differently affected by two poorer options: the inclusion of the better of the poor 
options did not change the choices made by birds while the inclusion of the poorest 
option led to a decreased proportion of choices for the best option.  In this experiment, 
the aim was to determine whether a similar effect could be demonstrated when human 
participants were assessing the health of faces.  Participants were presented with 
choice sets of either two or three faces (variations of the same face), which varied only 
in their yellowness and asked to judge which face looked the healthiest.  As in Chapter 
3 with hummingbirds, in binary choice sets participants were presented with two faces 
that were both moderately yellow, but one a little more yellow (Yellow +) and one a 
little less yellow (Yellow-).  In this experiment, however, one trinary choice set 
consisted of a Yellow + face, a Yellow - face, and a face that was a little less Yellow 
(Yellow 2-) while in the other trinary, the choice was among Yellow + face, a Yellow - 
face, and a face that was even less Yellow (Yellow 3-).  
If humans respond to the presence of the poor options in a choice set in the way 
that the hummingbirds did, we expected the addition of the slightly less healthy option 
(option Yellow 2-) to slightly increase the choice of Yellow + as being the healthiest 
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face while we expected the addition of the much less healthy option would increase the 
perceived health of the Yellow - option.  
 
Methods 
Participants 
19 students at the University of St Andrews volunteered to take part in an 
experiment investigating the effect of skin-colour changes on the perception of health. 
11 of the participants identified themselves as Caucasian, two identified as Latin 
American and six did not give their ethnicity. Six participants identified themselves as 
male, twelve identified as female and one participant did not give their gender. The 
experiment took place between 9am-5pm in a small testing room with plain white 
walls containing a desk, chair and a computer. Once the experimenter had explained 
what the participants were required to do, the experiment left the room for the 
participants to complete the experiment, which took roughly an hour to complete.  
I obtained ethical approval from the University of St Andrews Teaching and 
Research Ethics Committee, and prior to the experiment we obtained informed written 
consent from all participants.  Participants were made aware that they could withdraw 
from the experiment at any time without explanation.  Before they began the 
experiment, they completed a questionnaire identifying their sex, country of residence, 
ethnic origin and sexual preference (for questionnaire see appendix). Although 
preference for yellowness has been shown cross culturally, a preference for yellower 
faces is stronger in same ethnicity faces (Stephen et al., 2012), I asked participants to 
identify their ethnicity so that we could assess whether this played any role in the 
participants’ preferences.  
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Image creation  
The faces we used in the experiment were of 29 Caucasian females without makeup 
and with neutral expressions. The photographs were taken using a Fujifilm FinePix 
S5Pro digital SLR camera (60mm fixed length lens) in a booth painted with 
achromatic matt grey paint. For these images illumination was from three 6504K bulbs 
(VeriVide, Ltd). The camera was white-balanced according to a GregtagMacbeth 
white balance card in these lighting conditions. Participants held a grey painted board 
over their shoulders to prevent reflections from clothing. A GregtagMacbeth Mini 
ColorChecker was included in each image to color-calibrate images. Images were 
color-corrected by transforming observed values of each of the 24 color-checker 
patches towards known values of these same patches using a least-squares transform 
from an 11-expression polynomial expansion (Stephen et al., 2009, Stephen et al., 
2011, Whitehead et al., 2012). Matlab was used to calculate mean colour values across 
skin pixels for each face image and these colour values defined the starting colour for 
each face. The colour of each of the faces was adjusted by applying a mask of colour 
over the face which either increased or decreased the yellowness of the faces. The 
masks applied were Gaussian blurred at the edges of the face (SD ± 3 pixels), to 
prevent final images having an obvious color border. The mask changed the colour of 
the face including lips and ears but the eyes, hair and background were unchanged.  
Four versions of each face were created which varied in the Yellowness only. The least 
yellow shade was the Yellow 3- shade the yellowness of this shade was reduced by 
10.666 units. The Yellow 2- shade had the yellowness decreased by 5.333 units and in 
the Yellow - shade the yellowness was decreased by 2.666 units of yellowness. For 
Shade Yellow + the yellowness of each face was increased by 2.666 units (Figure 1) 
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this shade appeared in the experiment in Chapter 6 and was the Yellow Minus shade in 
that experiment. Images were presented to the participants on a 19 inch Iiyama Vision 
Master 1451 monitor. Each image was 6cm by 8cm and presented on a black 
background.  The images were numbered from left to right so that participants could 
identify each image.  The positions of the images on the screen were randomized.   
 
                
Yellow 3-                 Yellow 2-                 Yellow -                   Yellow + 
Figure 1. An example face set showing one face in all of the four shades of yellow: 
Yellow 3-, Yellow 2-, Yellow -, Yellow +.  
 
Experimental Procedure 
The participants were presented with pairs or trios of faces and were asked to choose 
the face they considered to be healthiest.  There were either two or three faces in each 
set and all of the options were presented on the screen at the same time.  In each binary 
or trinary set the images were of the same face, each differing only in the yellowness 
of the face.  Binary choice sets consisted of a choice between the faces that were 
Yellow - and Yellow +. Trinary choice sets consisted of a Yellow – face, a Yellow + 
face and either a Yellow 2- face or a Yellow 3- face. After each choice set participants 
were asked to identify which face they thought looked the healthiest and to rate that 
health on a 10-point scale, ranging from very healthy to very unhealthy.  
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Each participant made health assessments of faces in the three contexts: one 
binary and two trinary, comprising all of the four versions of the face. In binary 
choices the images were on the screen for ten seconds and in trinary choices the 
images were on the screen for 15 seconds. The images were numbered left to right to 
allow participants to identify the face which looked healthiest. Each participant 
completed 90 trials. 
 
Analysis  
To assess the effects of context, we looked at the choices made to the two options that 
were present in every choice set (Yellow- and Yellow+).  
 As the data were not normally distributed, they were transformed prior to 
analysis using an arcsine square root transformation. Differences in the proportion of 
choices made to the Yellow + option in the different choice sets and different in the 
rating of the options was calculated using repeated measures ANOVAs. All results 
were Bonferroni corrected.  
 
Results 
Participants did not change their health assessment of the Yellow + face as a result of 
the addition of either the Yellow 2- option (F (2, 18) = 3.052, p = 0.107) or the Yellow 
3- option (F (2, 18) = 3.052, p > 0.999). The proportion of choices to the Yellow + 
faces as the healthiest was not different between the two trinary conditions (F (2, 18) = 
3.052, p = 0.243; Fig 2).  
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Figure 2. The proportion of choices participants made to the Yellow+ shade when 
options were presented in binary and trinary choice sets. Binary choice sets contained 
Yellow+ and Yellow- faces, one trinary set contained Yellow+, Yellow- and Yellow2- 
and the other trinary set contained Yellow+, Yellow- and Yellow 3. The dotted line 
represents no difference in preference between Yellow+ and Yellow-. The data are 
means ± s.e. (N = 19).  
 
 Participants also rated how healthy they thought the face that they had chosen 
looked on a scale of 1-10. Participants’ rating of the Yellow + option did not change as 
a result of the inclusion of the Yellow 2- option (F (2, 18) = 1.616, p = 0.347) or of the 
Yellow 3- to the choice sets (F (2, 18) = 1.616, p = 0.648). The rating of the Yellow + 
option was also not different between the two trinary choice sets (F (2, 18) = 1.616, p > 
.999; Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. The average rating of the Yellow+ faces when options were presented in 
binary and trinary choice sets. Binary choice sets contained Yellow+ and Yellow- 
faces, one trinary set contained Yellow+, Yellow- and Yellow2- and the other trinary 
set contained Yellow+, Yellow- and Yellow 3.  The data are means ± s.e. (N = 19).   
 
Participants chose the Yellow + option as the healthiest more often than they 
chose the Yellow - option in all of the choice sets (binary: (M = 0.95, SE = 0.019) T 
(18) = 23.669, p < 0.001, Trinary Yellow 2-: (M = 0.98, SE = 0.98) T (18) = 48.895, p 
< 0.001, Trinary Yellow 3-: (M = 0.95, SE = 0.019) T (18) = 23.423, p < 0.001). 
 
 
Discussion  
The addition of less healthy faces to choice sets of two moderately healthy 
faces did not change the assessments of health for those healthy faces. In all of the 
contexts, participants overwhelmingly assessed the Yellow + faces as being healthier 
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than the Yellow – faces.  
It would appear that humans do not necessarily respond to the presence of 
poorer options in choice sets in the way that hummingbirds do.  It is possible that the 
rating of the health of faces, or using the degree of yellow in that face to do so, is not 
context dependent. However, the data from the experiment in Chapter 6, as well as 
from experiments on other aspects of attractiveness, demonstrate that the preference 
for particular faces and bodies is, usually, influenced by the presence of other options 
(Wedell et al., 1987, Wedell and Pettibone, 1999, Wedell et al., 2005).  
Rather, it seems possible that the lack of effect of the inclusion of the less 
healthy faces was due to the rating by the participants of the healthy faces. Unlike the 
participants in the earlier experiment where the options were much yellower, here the 
participants almost exclusively chose the Yellow + face as the most healthy.  Much of 
the theory underpinning context-dependence is based on the assumption that effects 
will only be seen when preferences are incomplete i.e. when one option is not 
obviously better and strongly preferred over all others (Gerasímou, 2010) (Bateman et 
al., 2008, Colman et al., 2007, Dato-on and Dahlstrom, 2003, De Martino et al., 2006, 
Doyle et al., 1999, Huber et al., 1982), it is perhaps not surprising that the inclusion of 
the less healthy faces did not cause participants to change their assessments. However, 
the almost exclusive selection of the yellowest face as the healthiest face does confirm 
that in Chapter 6 participants were assessing the health of the faces available rather 
than simply choosing the intermediate option. If participants were just choosing the 
intermediate option for reasons other than the assessment of health then participants 
would have also chosen the intermediate face in this experiment. As they did not and 
instead overwhelmingly chose the yellowest shades we can be confident that 
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participants in Chapter 6 were assessing the health of the faces. 
 
At this point, then, it is difficult, to assess whether the variation in the decoy 
options would exert a similar effect on health assessments as seen in the hummingbirds 
experiment (Chapter 3).  This needs to be examined in an experiment where 
participants rate the two options in the binary context more similarly.   
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Chapter 8: General discussion 
In this thesis, I set out to determine whether context affects the choices that 
hummingbirds make when foraging.  In addition, as human experiments are often used 
to make predictions about how context might change the choices made by animals, I 
wanted to determine how similar the effects of context on hummingbird decision 
making are to the effects of context on decision making by humans.  
 Initially I varied the options provided to hummingbirds in two dimensions, 
volume and concentration of sucrose solution. As is consistent with previous work on 
hummingbirds (Bateson et al., 2002, Bateson et al., 2003), in Chapter 2 hummingbirds 
changed their preferences when inferior options were added to choices sets. The 
explanations I predictions I proposed prior to the experiment were that birds could 
changing their choices due to changes in energy state (Schuck-Paim et al., 2004) or 
that birds may show the  decoy effect (Bateson et al., 2002, Bateson et al., 2003, Doyle 
et al., 1999). However, the choices made by birds were inconsistent with one another 
and were not consistent with either of these hypotheses. There are several possible 
explanations for these inconsistent preferences. The first is that the changes which 
birds showed were mistakes rather than departures from economic rationality. The 
second is that birds may have been attending to different cues, therefore when inferior 
options were added some birds changed their preference in one direction and other 
individuals showed a different change in preference. If this were the case I would 
expect that birds would show consistent context-dependent preferences when options 
varied in a single dimension as birds could only attend to a single cue. To test this I 
conducted the experiment in Chapter 3, where I looked at the effect of the addition of 
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inferior options to a choice sets when options were varied in a single dimension. The 
addition of much poorer options to choices sets changed birds’ preferences with all 
birds reducing their preference for their preferred option. As the manipulation of 
options which varied in a single dimension produced preference changes where all 
birds were consistent with one another, in subsequent experiments I continued to use 
options which varied in a single dimension only.  
In human decision-making presentation context makes a difference to the 
choices which people make, so to see if presentation also changes the decisions 
animals make in Chapter 4 I presented hummingbirds with options either 
simultaneously or sequentially. When options were presented simultaneously birds 
chose preferred options more frequently and made fewer choices to non-preferred 
options than when the options were presented sequentially. In both human and animal 
decision making prior experience of options can change the choices made to those 
options in future choices (Simonson and Tversky, 1992, Waite, 2001b), in Chapter 5 I 
manipulated the amount of prior experience a hummingbird had of the options by 
either matching the colours of options to those already learned or not matching the 
colours. The choices made by hummingbirds were only temporarily altered by the 
prior experience of the options, which suggests that having prior experience of options 
does not have a lasting impact on the decisions made by hummingbirds. As the rufous 
hummingbird migrates long distances and the availability and species of flower varies 
considerably over the breeding season, it is perhaps not surprising that the birds are not 
influenced by options they have previously experienced. As they live in seasonal 
environments so the options experienced in the recent past may not be a good indicator 
of future foraging options. 
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In addition to experiments with hummingbirds I also tried to create analogous 
experiments with humans to compare the choices made by humans and hummingbirds. 
In Chapter 6 I offered participants choices of faces which varied in their yellowness. I 
found that the perception of health in faces could be altered by the addition of non-
preferred options to the choice, as is the case in animals. As the preference for the 
yellowness of faces was context dependent, in Chapter 7 I designed an experiment 
with humans using the yellowness of faces which replicated the hummingbird 
experiment in Chapter 3. In Chapter 7 participants had an overwhelming preference for 
one of the options. They did not change their preference for this option when non 
preferred options were added to the choice sets. As a result of the overwhelming 
preference of the participants for the yellowest face I was not able to compare the 
results of this experiment with those of Chapter 3.  
One of the aims of this thesis was to determine how similar  the effects of 
context are on the choices made by animals and humans. The reason I wanted to look 
at this is that many of the experiments looking at context-dependent choice are 
inspired by behavioural economics experiments, for example, many experiments with 
animals create asymmetrically dominating decoys and make the prediction that when a 
decoy is added animals (like humans) will increase their preference for the option that 
is most similar to the decoy (Bateson et al., 2002, Bateson et al., 2003, Latty and 
Beekman, 2011, Royle et al., 2008, Shafir et al., 2002). The changes in preference that 
occur in these experiments are not always in the predicted direction which suggests 
that there may be a different process underlying the changes in preference in humans 
and animals (Bateson et al., 2002, Royle et al., 2008). If the process underlying the 
changes in preference in human and animal decision-making is very different then 
Chapter 8- General discussion                                                                                     124 
 
 
continued experiments which use the same paradigms as those in the human literature 
might not be the best course of study and instead we should build new theories 
focusing only on animal data.  
One of the reasons why it is not clear whether the processes underlying the 
choices made by humans and animals are similar is that the experiments with humans 
are difficult to replicate with animals. Human participants are typically told about the 
options whereas animals have to assess the options themselves. In order to design 
comparable experiments in humans and animals I designed experiments with humans 
which replicated some of the main features of experiments with animals. In chapter 6 I 
confirmed that humans made context dependent decisions when the options varied 
only in the yellowness of the faces available to choose from. Chapter 7 was a 
replication of the hummingbird experiment in Chapter 3. In this experiment human 
participants were given choices between faces which varied in the yellowness only. In 
Chapter 3 the options which hummingbirds choose between vary in concentration with 
the most concentrated option (30% sucrose solution) having a concentration higher 
than many hummingbird flowers (Stiles, 1976, Baker, 1975) but less concentrated than 
the concentrations of sucrose hummingbirds prefer in experiments (Blem et al., 2000), 
(Stiles, 1976, Morgan et al., 2012, Blem et al., 1997, Stromberg and Johnsen, 1990). 
Therefore, in order to make the experiments as comparable as possible the options 
available for humans to choose between were also less yellow than the option they 
have the greatest preference for. However, this resulted in participants just choosing 
the yellowest option in each choice set; as a result I was not able to determine if the 
changes in preference between human and animal decisions are the same. Given that 
the hummingbirds had a split preference for the 20% and 30% sucrose solutions, it is 
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possible that the preference curve for the hummingbirds is not centred around as high a 
concentration as 50%. In addition the preference curve for the choice of yellowness in 
humans is a bell-shaped curve whereas in hummingbirds it is more flattened. Therefore 
only experiments in the lower concentrations and lower end of the yellowness scale of 
faces will have the same shape of preference curve. In order to use this experiment to 
answer questions about the similarity of human and animal decision-making, options 
would need to be chosen where participants did not have an overwhelming preference 
for one of the options, perhaps using the two faces from the binary choice in Chapter 6 
where preference was not absolute.  
Although I was not able to directly compare the choices made by humans and 
hummingbirds there are at least some differences in the choices made by 
hummingbirds and humans as the predictions made about the changes in preference 
that might be seen in Chapter 2 were based on the well-studied concept of 
asymmetrically dominating decoys. In humans the changes in preference are well 
documented and predictable. However, in the experiment in Chapter 2 the inconsistent 
changes in preference caused by the addition of decoys are not consistent with the data 
from humans which suggests that the mechanisms which may underpin economically 
irrational choice in humans and hummingbirds are likely to not be the same. Until 
experiments are conducted which provide both humans and animals with 
complimentary choices in order to help to establish whether or not economically 
irrational choice in humans and animals share any features, it seems doubtful that 
explaining animal decision-making using patterns of behaviour seen in humans will 
lead to new understanding.  
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 In this thesis I found that context can affect the decisions made by 
hummingbirds in a number of different ways; Chapters 2 and 3 shed light on how 
context can affect the choices made by hummingbirds as the addition of inferior 
options in both single dimensional and multidimensional choice changes the 
preferences birds show between options. These changes in preference are not 
consistent with animals making economically rational choices and are not able to be 
easily explained by changes in energetic state of the animals during the experiments. In 
Chapter 2 birds changed their preference in response to the addition of poorer decoy 
options but the changes in preference observed were not consistent across birds. This is 
a difficult result to explain as you might expect that if there was a decision making 
mechanism which caused birds to make economically irrational choices, it would 
change choices in the same way for each bird. Therefore, it is possible that these 
changes in preference were mistakes on the part of the birds and so do not represent a 
significant departure from economic rationality. Alternatively, each bird may be 
attending to a different cue, either volume or concentration. Birds might attend to 
different cues due differences in their prior experiences. However, even if the birds 
were each using either volume or concentration of the options to guide their decisions 
it is unexpected that the different cues would both change the birds’ preference in the 
same way.  
In order to investigate whether the hummingbirds made consistent choices 
when there was only one cue I conducted the experiment in Chapter 3 where the 
options varied on only volume or concentration. When options varied in concentration 
only all birds reduced the proportion of choices they made to the most concentrated 
option. Whereas when options varied in volume only all birds decreased the proportion 
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of choices they made to their favoured option. However, for only one of the five birds 
was this the option with the highest volume, as unexpectedly four out of five birds did 
not prefer the option with the largest volume. There is no clear explanation for birds 
not choosing the option with the largest volume, as birds consumed almost all of the 
sucrose contained in the wells so obviously experienced the manipulation. They would 
be predicted to distinguish between options of different volumes as this would allow 
birds to visit the fewer wells to obtain a particular volume of sucrose. In the 
Concentration Treatment birds made economically irrational choices because they 
changed their preference upon the addition of a much poorer option (5%) to the choice. 
Although this was economically irrational it wasn’t necessarily biologically irrational 
as birds consumed the same amount of energy per minute in the binary choice as they 
did when the 5% option was added to the choice. In the Volume Treatment birds also 
made economically irrational choices as they changed their preferences when the 5µl 
option was added to a choice of 20µl and 30µl. In the Volume Treatment birds 
consumed more energy per minute in the presence of the poorer option than they did in 
the binary choice. So although birds made economically irrational choices there was a 
biological advantage to doing so as they had a higher energy intake. This could be 
interpreted as either birds making better choices (by favouring the option with the 
larger volume) as a result of an adaptive decision making mechanism or alternatively 
that judging decisions by looking at economically irrational choices is not appropriate 
as that decision-making should not be expected to be consistent across contexts. I think 
that looking at economically irrational choices in animals may help us to examine 
decision-making mechanisms but that choices should not be judged as poor if they are 
economically irrational.  
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 In this thesis hummingbirds changed their preferences when non-preferred 
options were added to choice sets. It has been suggested that one explanation for 
changes in preference in foraging experiments as a result of non-preferred options 
being added to the choice sets might be changes in energy state (Schuck-Paim et al., 
2004). In previous experiments the addition of non-preferred options which have lower 
energy contents caused an increase in preference for the option with the greatest 
energy content (Bateson et al., 2002), which could be explained by changes in energy 
state as the birds would be consuming more of the best option to compensate for 
sampling the poor non-preferred option. In Chapters 2 and 3, the addition of a poorer 
option actually decreased the preference for the option which had the highest energy, 
which shows that not all context-dependent changes in preference in foraging animals 
can be explained by changes in energy state. However, despite changes in energy state 
not explaining all of the context-dependent foraging choices made by animals, it may 
still play an important role in the choices made and therefore should be controlled for. 
In foraging experiments energy is very difficult to exclude but energy state could be 
controlled by either presenting options that contain the same amount of energy, or by 
controlling the energy state of animals through supplementary feeding and the 
monitoring of their weight. If these alternatives are not possible then experiments into 
the decision-making mechanisms of animals might be best investigated in a non-
foraging context, for example, mate choice.  
  In this thesis the majority of the experiments conducted with hummingbirds 
and all of the experiments with humans looked at choice amongst options which varied 
in a single dimension, which for the hummingbirds was either concentration or volume 
of sucrose solution and for human participants was the yellowness of faces.  The 
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advantages of using options which vary in only a single dimension are a greater level 
of control. When options vary in more than one dimension (as in Chapter 2) it is not 
clear whether all of the animals are paying attention to the same cue. Therefore, when 
all birds did not make the same decisions it is not clear why. When options vary in 
more than one dimension individuals could pay attention to different cues, assess the 
cues different and weight the cues differently than other individuals. But when options 
are manipulated in only one dimension, as there is only one thing changing we can be 
confident that birds are either indifferent to the manipulation or they are paying 
attention to the only cue which is altered. However, there are some disadvantages of 
manipulating options in only a single dimension, for many animals (although not all) 
foraging on options which vary in only a single dimension might be somewhat 
artificial. Although it is worth noting that there will be other animals (particularly 
specialists with little variation in their diets) for whom options varying only in a single 
dimension would be more realistic than options which varied in multiple dimensions. 
In addition, many of the experiments carried out in both humans and animals occur 
when the items vary in more than one dimension, therefore, it is more challenging to 
make predictions about the effects we might expect when options only vary in a single 
dimension as there is a smaller volume of experimental evidence and theoretic ideas.  
 In this thesis hummingbirds did change their decisions in response to changes 
in context but these changes did not always occur and are not always consistent across 
individuals. As such it is difficult to assess the possible mechanisms which may or 
may not underpin these choices and it is not clear how important irrational decisions 
might be in an individual’s lifetime. If animals were systematically economically 
irrational it would not necessarily mean that they made poor choices, as was the case in 
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Chapter 3; economically irrational choices might be better than economically rational 
choices. There are two possible explanations for economically irrational choices; the 
first is that these choices might be sufficiently rare as to make little difference to the 
life of the animal, perhaps occurring in experiments but rarely in the animal’s natural 
decision making environment. Alternatively if animals were systematically 
economically irrational this might suggest that economically irrational choices are 
adaptive. Economically irrational choices could be adaptive if there were a cost to 
rational decision making that could be reduced by making an irrational choice. If the 
benefits of making an irrational choice outweighed the cost then irrational decision 
making could be selected for. An example of this might be a time cost associated with 
economically rational decision making. If the animal could use a heuristic which 
would allow the animal to make a good but not necessarily economically rational 
choice more quickly, then this would be selected for if the benefit of the shorter 
decision time outweighed the cost of occasionally not making the correct choice. Here 
choices would be economically irrational but biologically rational as over the course of 
the animal’s lifetime these choices would be expected to maximise its fitness. Finding 
economically irrational choices does not necessarily imply that animals are not 
foraging optimally for their environment; instead it could suggest an adaptive 
mechanism enabling the animal to reduce the cost of decision making. 
Using wild free living rufous hummingbirds in decision making experiments 
has advantages and disadvantages. One of the advantages of using free living 
hummingbirds is the choices the birds make are not consequence free; as the birds feed 
almost exclusively from the options available in the experiments they are highly 
motivated to make good choices. In addition, the birds are also defending their 
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territories and mating whilst the experiment is in progress, as a result birds making 
choices under the normal levels of time pressure which they would if they were 
foraging from flowers. Therefore, the choice the hummingbirds make are likely to be 
ecologically relevant so we can be confident that the context-dependent effect we 
observe is not due to a lack of motivation or a unnatural level of time pressure and 
therefore is not likely to impact on the birds choices in natural situations. There are 
also some drawbacks to using wild hummingbirds for decision making experiments as 
there is a reduced level of control. For example, in Chapter 5 I manipulated the prior 
experience of the birds in the experiment, however, I could only look at the prior 
experienced received in the experiment, experience prior to the experiment could not 
be controlled. As not all birds were marked at the same point in the season and there 
was variation between the capture of birds to mark and their entry into the experiment 
it seems unlikely that body mass would provide a useful measure of prior experience.    
The use of the yellowness of faces also has advantages and disadvantages. 
Faces could be a good way of looking at context-dependent choice in humans as there 
are several aspects of faces, such as yellowness, which are able to be manipulated 
independently. In addition humans, like animals, need to assess the faces rather than be 
told about the values of each of the options. Also importantly, the preference for these 
faces is context-dependent and in a single dimension options could be created which 
did not take all of the choices. However, the use of faces also has challenges as people 
can have very strong preferences and the situation is somewhat artificial with people 
rating different versions of the same face. 
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Future directions 
Looking at the natural history of context-dependent decision making might 
help us to understand the reasons why we might not expect animals to be economically 
rational. If for example we only saw context-dependant choices when the 
consequences of making a poor choice were low and decisions needed to be made 
quickly we might conclude that context-dependent decision making might not be a 
mistake but instead could be caused by an adaptive process to enable animals to make 
decent, but not perfect, quick choices. In addition to a range of animals, the natural 
history of context-dependent choice would also look at the range of decision making 
contexts which are affected by context (mate choice, foraging etc.). Although looking 
at the natural history of the trait might not be able give a definitive answer to why 
context dependent choices are made, it could help to find areas which warrant further 
investigation.  
In addition to the natural history, understanding what the brain is doing in 
decision-making may well prove crucial for the understanding of context. For 
example, there is some evidence that the coding of value is not absolute and instead is 
changed by the presence of other options (Kable and Glimcher, 2007, Louie and 
Glimcher, 2012).  It has been argued that the systems for coding value are structurally 
similar to those which send perceptual information.  Perceptual information is 
influenced by context and these effects are thought to be at least in part due to the 
coding structure of perceptual systems, if the decision making system is structurally 
similar we might also expect it to be influenced by context (Louie and Glimcher, 
2012). 
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A third method for the further investigation of context-dependent decision-
making is mapping the decision space. For example in two dimensions, like volume 
and concentration of sucrose, what impact does a decoy have when placed in a variety 
of possible positions relative to the main options? Also what impact does adding more 
than three options have on the choices made? Answering these questions would help 
us to understand what information is used and what information is ignored when 
making choices. In addition if humans choice was also investigated in this way using 
comparable decision-making experiments it would allow a good understanding of how 
human and animal decision-making is linked and if it is appropriate to continue to use 
human decision making experiments to inspire experiments with animals. Specifically 
leading on from the experiments presented in this thesis the next step would be to 
continue to look at the similarities or differences between human and animal decision-
making. The two experiments that would be the next steps would be to replicate the 
human experiment in Chapter 6 with hummingbirds, where birds were given options of 
intermediate concentration of sucrose in addition to one option which is much more 
concentrated and one option which is much less concentrated. The other experiment 
would be to redo the experiment from Chapter 7 but to use the options present from the 
binary choices in Chapter 6, this would mean that participants did not overwhelmingly 
choose one of the options.  
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Chapter 2. Context-dependent decision making in hummingbirds: the role of decoys 
and energetic state on preference 
 
Figure 1. Layout of the Plexiglas board displaying a trinary choice. The space between each 
of the wells as well as the depth and diameter of the wells are displayed.  
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Figure 2. An image showing a hummingbird approaching the Plexiglas board to make a 
choice to one of three possible options, these options are indicated to the bird by the colour of 
the paper reinforcement around each well. This bird’s identifying mark is a pink line of ink 
and can be seen on the white feathers of the breast.  
 
Equation 1. 
 
 
Equation 2. 
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Chapter 3: Context-dependent decision making in a single dimension: inferior options 
make a difference  
Figure 1.  
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Figure 1.  
The total number of choices made by the birds to each of the options in the binary and trinary 
choice sets of the Concentration treatment. For all conditions the data are means ± s.e. (N = 
5). 
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. 
The cumulative number of choices made by the birds to each of the options in the binary and 
trinary choice sets of the Volume treatment. For all conditions the data are means ± s.e.  (N = 
5). 
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Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. 
The mean proportion of sucrose which birds consumed from the 20% and 30% options in the 
binary and trinary choice sets of the Concentration treatment. The data are means ± s.e. (N = 
5). 
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Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. 
The number of wells birds visited per bout in the binary and trinary choice sets of the 
Concentration treatment. The data are means ± s.e. (N = 5). 
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Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  
The number of grams of sucrose per minute birds consumed in each of the choice sets of the 
Concentration treatment. The data are means ± s.e. (N = 5). 
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Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. 
The mean proportion of the sucrose available in each well which birds consumed from the 
20µl and 30µl well types in the binary and trinary choice sets of the Volume Treatment. The 
data are means ± s.e. (N = 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix- Chapter 3                                                                                                              157 
 
  
 
 
Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. 
The volume of sucrose birds drank from each well type in the Volume Treatment. The data 
are means ± s.e. (N = 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix- Chapter 3                                                                                                              158 
 
  
 
 
Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.  
The number of grams of sucrose birds consumed per minute in each of the choice sets of the 
Volume treatment. The data are means ± s.e. (N = 5). 
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Chapter 4: Context-dependent decision making in a single dimension: prior experience 
does not change preferences 
 
Figure 1a 
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Figure 1c 
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Figure 1.  
The cumulative number of choices made by the birds to each of the options in the binary and 
trinary choice sets of the Trinary Matched treatment.  
(A) Binary: cumulative choices to 20% and 30% options through the binary treatment. 
(B) Trinary : cumulative choices to 20%, 30% and 5% options through the trinary 
condition where the colours of those options are matched to the preceding Binary 
(C) Binary Matched: cumulative choices to 20%, 30% options. 
For all conditions the data are means (N = 5). The dotted line indicates 50 well visits.  
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Figure 2a 
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Figure 2c 
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Figure 2.  
The cumulative number of choices made by the birds to each of the options in the binary and 
trinary choice sets of the Binary Matched treatment.  
(A) Binary: cumulative choices to 20% and 30% options through the binary treatment. 
(B) Trinary: cumulative choices to 20%, 30% and 5% options through the trinary 
condition. 
(C) Binary Matched: cumulative choices to 20%, 30% options where the colours of those 
options are matched to the preceding trinary 
For all conditions the data are means (N = 5). The dotted line indicates 50 well visits.  
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Chapter 5: Simultaneous or sequential presentation changes the choices made by 
hummingbirds 
Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. 
Separate Treatment.  (a) Number of choices birds made  in the three-option choice set made 
to 30% option when the 30% option was experienced first, second and last (i.e. immediately 
before the three-option choice set). The data are from individual birds (n = 7).   
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Figure 2 
Order of presentation of 5%
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Figure 2. 
Separate Treatment. (b) Number of choices which birds made in the three-option choices set 
made to the 5% option when the 5% option was presented first, second and last (i.e. 
immediately before the three-option choice set). Data are from individual birds (n = 7).
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Chapter 6: Context affects the assessment of health in human faces 
 
Participant 
number Treatment 
Proportion 
of choices 
to Yellow 
plus in the 
Trinary 
Minus 
choice  
Proportion 
of choices 
to Yellow 
plus in the 
Binary 
choice 
Proportion 
of choices 
to Yellow 
plus in the 
Trinary 
Plus 
choice 
Trinary 
Minus 
different 
from 
Binary? 
(P value) 
Trinary 
Plus 
different 
from 
Binary? 
(P value) 
Follow 
the 
expected 
pattern? 
1 Simultaneous 0.310345 0.466667 0.466667 0.288 1.000 Yes 
2 Simultaneous 0.448276 0.766667 0.965517 0.017 0.052 Yes 
3 Simultaneous 0.166667 0.533333 0.933333 0.006 0.001 Yes 
4 Simultaneous 0.655172 0.833333 0.962963 0.143 0.197 Yes 
5 Simultaneous 0.266667 0.5 0.733333 0.110 0.110 Yes 
6 Simultaneous 1 0.966667 1 
  
No 
7 Simultaneous 0.793103 0.833333 0.809524 0.748 1.000 No 
8 Simultaneous 0.083333 0.066667 0.517241 1.000 <.001 No 
9 Simultaneous 0.62069 0.666667 0.758621 0.789 0.567 Yes 
10 Simultaneous 0.966667 0.966667 0.9375 1.000 1.000 No 
11 Simultaneous 0.111111 0.333333 0.333333 0.610 1.000 Yes 
12 Simultaneous 0.083333 0.533333 0.758621 0.001 0.103 No 
13 Simultaneous 0.7 0.833333 1 0.360 
 
Yes 
14 Simultaneous 0.423077 0.5 0.714286 0.601 0.114 Yes 
15 Simultaneous 0.391304 0.5 0.827586 0.579 0.013 Yes 
16 Simultaneous 0.862069 1 0.954545 
  
No 
17 Simultaneous 0.033333 0.333333 0.466667 0.006 0.430 Yes 
18 Simultaneous 0.5 0.733333 0.966667 0.111 0.026 Yes 
19 Simultaneous 0.321429 0.3 0.62069 1.000 0.019 No 
20 Simultaneous 0.37037 0.666667 0.9 0.035 0.057 Yes 
21 Simultaneous 0.896552 0.9 1 1.000 
 
Yes 
22 Simultaneous 0.6 0.7 0.727273 0.571 1.000 Yes 
23 Simultaneous 0.3 0.533333 0.766667 0.115 0.103 Yes 
24 Simultaneous 0.862069 0.9 0.954545 0.706 0.629 Yes 
25 Simultaneous 0.9 0.9 0.923077 1.000 1.000 No 
26 Simultaneous 0.173913 0.333333 0.766667 0.225 0.002 Yes 
27 Simultaneous 0.344828 0.366667 0.642857 1.000 0.065 Yes 
28 Simultaneous 0.733333 0.833333 0.892857 0.523 0.707 Yes 
29 Simultaneous 0.214286 0.6 0.758621 0.004 0.267 Yes 
30 Simultaneous 0.344828 0.533333 0.551724 0.192 1.000 Yes 
31 Simultaneous 0.615385 0.633333 0.862069 1.000 0.072 Yes 
 
         
 
Table 1. The proportion of choices made by participants in the Simultaneous Treatment to the 
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Yellow + option by individual participants in the Binary, Trinary Minus and Trinary Plus 
choice sets. In addition the table also shows the result of chi squared tests which compare the 
choices made by each participant in both Trinary Plus and Trinary Minus choice sets with the 
choices made by that participant in Binary choice sets.  
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Participant 
number Treatment 
Proportion 
of choices 
to Yellow 
plus in the 
Trinary 
Minus 
choice  
Proportion 
of choices 
to Yellow 
plus in the 
Binary 
choice 
Proportion of 
choices to 
Yellow plus in 
the Trinary 
Plus choice 
Trinary 
Minus 
different 
from 
Binary? 
(P value) 
Trinary 
Plus 
different 
from 
Binary? 
(P value) 
Follow 
the 
expected 
pattern? 
1 Sequential 0.15 0.37 0.60 0.129 0.120 Yes 
2 Sequential 0.52 0.83 0.93 0.021 0.423 Yes 
3 Sequential 0.56 0.77 0.79 0.103 1.000 Yes 
4 Sequential 0.72 0.93 1.00 0.042 
 
Yes 
5 Sequential 0.86 0.83 0.89 1.000 0.709 No 
6 Sequential 0.93 0.93 0.91 1.000 1.000 Yes 
7 Sequential 0.92 0.83 0.82 0.431 1.000 No 
8 Sequential 0.36 0.33 0.37 1.000 0.788 Yes 
9 Sequential 0.59 0.73 0.87 0.279 0.333 No 
10 Sequential 0.89 1.00 1.00 
  
Yes 
11 Sequential 0.00 0.03 0.07 
 
1.000 Yes 
12 Sequential 0.00 0.20 0.63 
 
0.001 Yes 
13 Sequential 0.76 0.83 0.91 0.532 0.685 Yes 
14 Sequential 0.37 0.50 0.64 0.425 0.301 Yes 
15 Sequential 0.50 0.67 0.81 0.286 0.365 Yes 
16 Sequential 0.97 0.87 1.00 0.353 
 
No 
17 Sequential 0.23 0.33 0.53 0.554 0.192 Yes 
18 Sequential 0.59 0.83 0.93 0.047 0.424 Yes 
19 Sequential 0.03 0.13 0.28 0.353 0.209 Yes 
20 Sequential 0.04 0.27 0.77 0.026 <0.001 Yes 
21 Sequential 0.93 0.97 1.00 0.619 
 
Yes 
22 Sequential 0.64 0.60 0.80 0.788 0.216 Yes 
23 Sequential 0.10 0.57 0.73 <.001 0.279 Yes 
24 Sequential 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  
Yes 
25 Sequential 0.93 0.93 0.92 1.000 1.000 No 
26 Sequential 0.32 0.47 0.69 0.407 0.115 Yes 
27 Sequential 0.32 0.33 0.48 1.000 0.290 Yes 
28 Sequential 0.83 0.87 0.96 0.731 0.367 Yes 
29 Sequential 0.12 0.60 0.72 <.001 0.412 Yes 
30 Sequential 0.25 0.63 0.54 0.007 0.595 No 
31 Sequential 0.66 0.73 0.96 0.580 0.026 Yes          
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Table 2. The proportion of choices made by participants in the Sequential Treatment to the 
Yellow + option by individual participants in the Binary, Trinary Minus and Trinary Plus 
choice sets. In addition the table also shows the result of chi squared tests which compare the 
choices made by each participant in both Trinary Plus and Trinary Minus choice sets with the 
choices made by that participant in Binary choice sets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
